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INTRODUCTION

To err is human. But we humans decidedly dislike error in
1
legal fact-finding, even though we know it occurs. Confidence in
and respect for the law as a method for dispute resolution depends
on participants having a substantial degree of faith in the accuracy
of legal fact-finding. Therefore, “getting it right” as often as
possible is one key objective that informs the design of our legal
2
system, its procedures, and its rules.
The law does not claim infallibility, of course. Its standards of
proof are not absolute. Nor does law necessarily treat all errors
equally. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
criminal cases evinces a strong preference for mistaken acquittal
3
over mistaken conviction. The clear and convincing standard
applied in some civil cases reflects a weaker but definite view that in
those cases, an erroneous affirmative finding of the proposition
4
advocated is worse than an erroneous rejection of the proposition.
By contrast, the preponderance of the evidence standard of
persuasion applied in most civil cases reflects, in principle,
neutrality between incorrect impositions of liability and incorrect

1. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1051, 1052 (2010) (“[P]ostconviction DNA has exonerated 252 convicts, forty-two
of whom falsely confessed to rapes and murders.”).
2. Russell Brown, The Possibility of “Inference Causation”: Inferring Cause-in-Fact
and the Nature of Legal Fact-Finding, 55 MCGILL L.J. 1, 14 (2010) (“[T]ruth-seeking is
an elemental aspiration of our legal order.”); Andrew R. Klein, Causation and
Uncertainty: Making Connections in a Time of Change, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 5, 8 (2008)
(“[L]aw and uncertainty will remain intertwined, but the quest for getting it right
should continue unabated”); Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability and
Warranted Factfinding, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1996) (“[I]deal of legal factfinding . . . entails attaining truth.”).
3. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997)
(discussing origins, applications and variations of the maxim “[b]etter that ten
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”).
4. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1984) (holding
that error allocation principles warrant imposing a clear-and-convincing standard
on a state seeking diversion of previously appropriated water, because the harm to
the party losing water is usually certain and immediate while the benefits to the
party diverting water may be speculative and remote); Christopher M.
Pietruszkiewicz, Conflating Standards of Review in the Tax Court: A Lesson in Ambiguity,
44 HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1366 n.167 (2008) (identifying patent infringement,
involuntary commitment, parental rights termination, deportation, and
denaturalization as types of cases in which clear and convincing evidence is
required because they “involve more than the loss of money and concern
important individual interests”).
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5

refusals to impose liability, except in the rare case of evidence in
6
perfect equipoise, when it breaks the tie in favor of the defense.
When causation is at issue in toxic tort claims, however, this
theory has not aligned well with judicial practice. Such cases may
present genuine scientific uncertainty, in which there is reason to
suspect a disease-exposure link and reason to doubt it. Each case
must be resolved, but any resolution risks error. Causation might
be found although the asserted causal link is or later proves to be
non-existent: a false positive. Or causation might not be found
even though the asserted causal link is or later proves to be true: a
7
false negative.
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. e reporters’ note (2010) (“The law has already decided that, while it
attempts to minimize errors, for those that do occur the law treats as equally costly
errors favoring plaintiffs or defendants in civil cases and adopted a preponderance
standard that reflects that determination.”); see Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (explaining that a preponderance standard
requires both sides to share the risk of error roughly equally, while “[a]ny other
standard expresses a preference for one side’s interests”). Some have questioned
whether the preponderance standard should operate this way. See, e.g., Howard v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359–60 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Judges, and
commentators on the law of evidence, have been troubled by cases in which the
plaintiff has established a probability that only minutely exceeds [fifty]-percent
that his version of what happened is correct” because of the transaction costs of
adjudication). Others have doubted that the preponderance standard as applied
actually achieves an equal distribution of the risk of error. See Walker, supra note
2, at 1099–1109 (criticizing claim that preponderance standard, understood as
probability greater than 0.5, produces equal numbers of errors in favor of
plaintiffs and defendants); id. at 1119–20 (arguing that unbiased treatment of
parties, distinct from equal error distribution, still requires “a mid-range decision
value”).
6. This is true, of course, only of matters deemed “elements” of the
plaintiff’s case. For affirmative defenses on which the defendant bears the burden
of proof, the tie-breaker favors plaintiff.
7. See David L. Faigman, Judges as “Amateur Scientists,” 86 B.U. L. REV. 1207,
1212–14 (2006) (describing false positive and negative legal errors and illustrating
that each of these errors may have distinctive costs). Scientists also distinguish
between false positives and false negatives. Scientific research often compares
some attribute of two samples to determine whether the attribute differs between
the populations being sampled. The assumption that no difference exists is called
the null hypothesis. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on
Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 167 (Fed. Judicial Ctr.
ed., 2d ed. 2000). Statisticians conventionally divide sampling error into “Type I”
error, which occurs when sampling error creates the illusion of a difference even
though the populations’ parametric values are the same, and “Type II” error,
which occurs when the sample measurements fail to detect a real difference
between the parametric values. Id. at 176. Type I and Type II errors can be
characterized as “false negatives” and “false positives,” respectively. Id. To avoid
any implication that the potential errors in legal fact-finding discussed herein are
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In these circumstances, many courts do not behave as though
the two types of error carry equal costs. Instead, using substantive
requirements as well as evidentiary rules with dispositive effect,
these courts demonstrate a preference for tolerating false negative
findings on causation rather than risk false positive findings,
creating a “false negative asymmetry” in toxic tort causation law.
Part II of this article argues that a widespread preference for
false negatives on toxic tort causation can be inferred from the case
8
law. Part III examines several possible sources of the false negative
asymmetry and assesses their explanatory and normative
9
persuasiveness. Part IV evaluates the extended treatment of toxic
tort causation in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
10
Physical and Emotional Harm (2010) (Third Restatement) and
11
concludes that the Third Restatement undermines the claim that
the legal rules that produce the false negative asymmetry are mere
12
enhancements to judicial truth-seeking. Therefore, if the Third
Restatement is properly understood and applied by courts, it could
reshape toward symmetry the currently asymmetrical law of toxic
tort causation.
II. THE JUDICIAL PREFERENCE FOR FALSE NEGATIVES IN TOXIC TORT
CAUSATION
Scientific uncertainty of a type not usually seen in other tort
cases poses recognized, unique obstacles to proof of toxic tort
13
causation. Although some commentators have argued that these
14
obstacles justify various proposals to relax the burden of proof,
congruent with the statistical concepts, this Article uses “Type I” and “Type II” only
in their statistical sense.
8. See infra Part II. This is not intended to suggest that case law is uniform or
that all jurisdictions or all courts have applied the false negative asymmetry.
9. See infra Part III. This analysis focuses on the decision rules that create
the asymmetry rather than the correctness of the outcome in individual cases,
including the cases in which those rules were articulated.
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c, cmt. c reporters’ note (2010).
11. Unless otherwise made clear, “Third Restatement” herein refers generally
to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 F. Supp. 972, 995 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(“In toxic tort cases, the Court must be aware of ‘the difficulty of scientists and
hence of judges, lawyers, and jurors in knowing what reasonable inferences of
causation to draw . . . .’” (citation omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c (2010).
14. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New
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courts for the most part continue to insist that toxic tort plaintiffs
establish causation in the traditional counterfactual way: proving
that, more likely than not, a plaintiff’s illness or injury would not
15
have occurred but for a defendant’s tortious conduct.
But to say that a plaintiff must prove but-for causation by a
preponderance of the evidence is to begin rather than to end the
inquiry, for the next question is what a plaintiff must accomplish to
satisfy that burden. To give content to the factual causation
element of a toxic tort claim, judges must make legal decisions
about what evidence will be considered probative and what
evidence will be considered sufficient (at least to create a triable
issue). These choices, on a series of issues relating to both
admissibility and sufficiency of evidence, reveal that many courts
believe it is better to risk rejecting a plaintiff’s claim of causation
that (while uncertain) might be true than to risk finding a
defendant liable based on a claim of causation that (while
uncertain) might be untrue.
A. Judicial Treatment of General and Specific Causation
After a traumatic accident, fact-finders quite willingly infer
causation from the simple temporal sequence that a plaintiff was
uninjured before the accident and was suffering from harm
16
afterward.
Courts rarely allow similar inference in toxic injury
Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997) (arguing that not
requiring proof of general causation would enhance tort law’s corrective justice
function); Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to
Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
1 (2001) (proposing an administrative and legislative approach using
presumptions to link causation to culpability); David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 849 (1984) (arguing that proportional recovery would improve tort law’s
efficiency performance).
15. See, e.g., June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1244 (10th Cir.
2009). The major exception has occurred where the causal link between a
substance and a disease was relatively clear, and the principal problem was
identifying the manufacturer or supplier of the particular disease-causing product.
See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1219–20 (Cal. 1997)
(holding that in light of “irreducible uncertainty” of determining which
defendants’ asbestos fibers actually contributed to cellular development of cancer,
each product would be “a substantial factor in causing . . . the disease if . . . it was a
substantial factor contributing to . . . [the] risk of developing cancer”); Hymowitz
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1078 (N.Y. 1989) (approving market share
liability in DES cases where injured daughters could not identify manufacturer of
pill ingested by their mothers).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
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cases, because of the invisible mechanism and delayed effect of
toxic exposures, as well as the existence (except for “signature
17
diseases” ) of other potentially sufficient causes of the harm
18
suffered. Instead, courts often have required toxic tort plaintiffs
to prove both “general causation”—that the accused exposure is
capable of causing the plaintiff’s illness in at least some people—and
“specific causation”—that the particular plaintiff’s illness is an
19
instance of the general causation possibility. These concepts lurk,
20
as a philosophical matter, in almost any causal inquiry, but their
21
express invocation is virtually unique to toxic torts.

28 (2010).
17. For a signature disease, exposure to a particular substance seems to
account for virtually all known cases of the illness. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v.
Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 142 n.4 (2003) (“Asbestos is the only cause of mesothelioma
established thus far, although some instances of the disease are not traceable to
asbestos.”); see also Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 575, 587 n.52 (identifying cervical and vaginal clear cell adenoma
as signatures of in utero exposure to DES).
18. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, The Future of Proportional Liability: The Lessons of
Toxic Substances Causation, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 352, 372–73 (M. Stuart Madden
ed., 2005) (explaining causation difficulties in toxic tort cases).
19. See, e.g., In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 596 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2010)
(noting that although plaintiff’s experts could testify as to general causation, “the
issue on appeal is specific causation”); Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F.
Supp. 2d 1142, 1176 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (noting that plaintiff must prove both
general and specific causation although the “court’s ultimate focus” is proof that
exposure caused the individual plaintiff’s disease).
20. Joseph Sanders, The Controversial Comment c: Factual Causation in
Toxic-substance and Disease Cases, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1034 n.19 (2009); see
generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c reporters’ note (2010) (citing Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal–Fulks, The
Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases:
The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110
n.13 (2001)).
21. A few courts have borrowed these concepts and applied them to other
types of cases in which the fact-finder could not readily infer causation from
common experience. For example, in a case involving a house fire allegedly
caused by a defective clothes dryer, the court described the general causation issue
as whether restricted airflow could cause lint buildup in dryers and specific
causation as whether this occurred in the particular dryer in question.
Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., No. 08-CV00623(A)(M), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96153, at *13–14 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2010)
(citing Amorgianos v. Nat’l R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 268 (2d Cir. 2002), a
toxic tort case in which plaintiff alleged paint fumes caused nervous system
damage) (excluding defense expert’s testimony on specific causation for failure to
rule out other causes).
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The sharp distinction was originally urged by plaintiffs’ lawyers
seeking the leverage of class treatment in mass exposure cases, who
argued that general causation was a common issue meriting classwide adjudication even if each plaintiff’s claim of specific causation
22
required individual resolution. The distinction invited courts to
consider independently what evidence would support reasonable
inferences, as opposed to impermissible speculation, of general
and specific causation. To the extent courts treat general and
specific causation as separate elements requiring distinct proof,
plaintiffs who already confront scientific uncertainty may be
required to jump two hurdles instead of one—increasing the
likelihood of false negative adjudications on causation.
23
Casey v. Ohio Medical Products illustrates the thought process.
Defendant moved to exclude plaintiff’s proffered expert testimony
24
that halothane caused plaintiff’s chronic hepatitis. “The term

22. Joseph Sanders traced judicial use of these terms to an opinion in the
Agent Orange litigation. Sanders, supra note 20, at 1030 n.5 (citing In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 570 F. Supp. 693, 695 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)). The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation had earlier concluded that the “characteristics” of
Agent Orange, “including its allegedly toxic nature,” presented factual issues
common to multiple cases. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M.D.L. 381,
1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9945, at *5–6 (J.P.M.L. Jan. 29, 1980). The district judge
assigned to the transferred multidistrict litigation quickly recognized that “there is
a major dispute over whether Agent Orange can cause the injuries in question, and
there are separate disputes over whether the exposure claimed in each case did cause
the injuries claimed.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 783
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (emphasis added). Therefore, class treatment made sense for
“the many questions embodied in the concept of ‘general causation,’” even
though “issues of specific causation and damages will . . . ultimately require
individual consideration.” Id. at 787–88; see also In re Diamond Shamrock Chems.
Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100
F.R.D. 718, 722–24 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (formally certifying class action in part
because general causation was common issue), mandamus denied. But see, e.g., In re
Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 733 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that general causation was common issue justifying class certification).
In another early use of these terms, some courts and commentators used “general
causation” to refer to the link between a particular material (e.g. asbestos) and a
disease, and used “specific causation” to refer to the link between a particular
defendant’s product containing that material and a particular plaintiff’s disease.
See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1429, 1436 (D. Kan. 1986); Richard
Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 881, 882 n.8 (1982).
23. 877 F. Supp. 1380 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
24. Halothane is a halogenated hydrocarbon used as an anesthetic. U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDELINE FOR HALOTHANE,
http://63.234.227.130/SLTC/healthguidelines/halothane/recognition.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2011).
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‘causation’ has two meanings here,” the court explained, and the
evidence in support of each “meaning” of causation must be
26
examined separately.
Persuaded by defendant’s expert’s
testimony that “there has never been a reported case or an
epidemiological study plausibly linking halothane to chronic active
hepatitis,” the court ruled that plaintiff’s proffered expert
27
testimony on general causation was unreliable and inadmissible.
With that, the court might have dispensed with discussion of
specific causation, but it chose to address specific causation
“because specific causation is a vital step in the required chain of
28
The court held that plaintiff’s proffered
legal causation . . . .”
expert testimony on specific causation, too, was both inadmissible
29
and insufficient. In doing so, the court offered a glimpse of what
it would require as evidence of specific causation:
Plaintiff again relies upon Dr. Harrison to establish
specific causation. Dr. Harrison does so in paragraphs of
his declaration in which he analyzes the information
known about the progress of plaintiff’s disease and
plaintiff’s possible pre-existing conditions.
However,
direct evidence is scant—not because of any lack of
diligence on Dr. Harrison’s part, but because of the
limited information available about plaintiff’s pathology
and the lengthy fifteen year period of his decline. With
scant direct evidence, Dr. Harrison’s opinion about “did”
30
must rely heavily upon this opinion about “can.”
The key is the court’s desire for “direct” evidence, whatever
that might be. This demand is akin to a requirement of
31
“particularistic” evidence on specific causation, in contrast to (and
25. 877 F. Supp. at 1382 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 43 F.3d
1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995)).
26. Id. at 1383 (noting that plaintiff’s expert testimony “must include both
general causation (can halothane cause chronic active hepatitis) and specific
causation (did plaintiff’s exposure to halothane cause his chronic active
hepatitis)”).
27. Id. at 1384–86.
28. Id. at 1386; see also Dunn v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 672,
676 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (noting that, because the court excluded plaintiff’s expert
testimony on general causation, “it is unnecessary to consider” experts who would
testify on specific causation).
29. Casey, 877 F. Supp. at 1386.
30. Id.
31. See Joseph Sanders, Apportionment and Proof in Toxic Injury Cases, 10 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 200, 202 (2000) (noting that particularistic evidence has been the
“holy grail” of toxic tort cases).
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in addition to) an insistence on group-based epidemiologic
32
evidence on general causation. Much judicial analysis of specific
causation betrays continued uneasiness with cases that lack such
individualized proof. For example, in Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips
33
Co., the court rejected plaintiff’s attempt to prove specific
causation in the face of defense testimony that most cases of
34
plaintiff’s disease were idiopathic:
[T]he only reason cited for distinguishing Henricksen’s
disease from one of “no known cause” was the existence of
a known risk factor, namely exposure to benzene.
Standing alone, the presence of a known risk factor is not
a sufficient basis for ruling out idiopathic origin in a
particular case . . . .
[Plaintiff’s expert] could have
compared the presentation of Henricksen’s symptoms
with those in chemically induced AML cases . . . . None of
the features characteristic or commonly seen in secondary
35
AML have been associated with Henricksen’s case.
The lack of some kind of corroborative particularistic evidence
36
Alternatively, some
has been important in other cases as well.
courts have said that to “satisfy specific causation, plaintiff’s expert
witnesses were required to exclude all other possible causes” of
37
38
plaintiff’s condition, an impossible demand. Courts that use less
32. The court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s expert’s opinion on general causation
relied heavily on the absence of epidemiologic evidence. Casey, 877 F. Supp. at
1384–85.
33. 605 F. Supp.2d 1142 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
34. The court appeared to equate idiopathic cases (“with no readily
identifiable cause”) with “endogenous” cases (“onset without external or
environmental stimulus”). Id. at 1149.
35. Id. at 1162–63.
36. See, e.g., Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 671 (6th Cir. 2010)
(noting that plaintiff’s expert could not describe any tests he had done “to tell the
difference between a welder with idiopathic Parkinson’s disease and a welder . . .
tipped into the Parkinson’s disease by welding”); Cord v. City of Los Angeles, No.
B167756, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8967, at *5 (2d Dist. Sept. 30, 2004)
(noting defense expert’s testimony that because plaintiffs did not test for
biomarkers of exposure, “‘it is impossible to determine to a medical certainty’”
whether decedent had been exposed to a potentially carcinogenic dose); see also
Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 362 F.3d 882, 890 n.5, 894 (6th Cir. 2004)
(describing “devastating” trial testimony by defense expert that decedent’s
cancerous tissue lacked histological and genetic changes caused by tobacco
smoke).
37. Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1473 (D.V.I.
1994) (emphasis added).
38. See Heller v. Shaw Inds., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
that district court erred in requiring expert to rule out all alternative possible
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absolute language nevertheless often impose very high burdens for
39
ruling out other possible causes.
These holdings do not merely restate the traditional causation
burden. They define that burden by deciding when inferences will
40
be permitted in the face of incomplete scientific understanding.
41
Despite disclaimers, holdings like these make it nearly impossible
for a plaintiff to succeed if a significant proportion of the incidence
of a disease is unexplained, because there is no way to exclude the
42
unknown.
Such rulings, though they may seem justified if unknown
causes account for eighty or ninety percent of the incidence of
43
plaintiff’s disease, quite consciously impose on plaintiffs the
44
burden of ignorance. The ignorance at issue, moreover, is not
ignorance of the alleged causal link between plaintiff’s exposure
and plaintiff’s illness, but of the causes of plaintiff’s illness in
45
general.
Over time, that ignorance may gradually yield to

causes); Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (N.Y. 1919) (noting that
ruling out all potential sources of plaintiff’s typhoid would be impossible, and
refusing to require plaintiff “to eliminate sources [of plaintiff’s disease] which had
not yet been determined or ascertained”).
39. See, e.g., Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 551–52
(W.D. Pa. 2003) (holding, while purportedly following Heller, that plaintiff must
“reliably rule out” any alternative cause that defendant shows is “plausible”);
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 720 (Tex. 1997) (stating
that even if reliable epidemiologic evidence shows that exposure more than
doubled risk, “if there are other plausible causes . . . that could be negated, the
plaintiff must offer evidence excluding those causes with reasonable certainty”); cf.
Henricksen v. Conoco Phillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1162 (E.D. Wash. 2009)
(noting that to be admissible, “expert testimony need not rule out all alternative
causes” but excluding testimony for failure to rule out alternative cause of “no
known cause”).
40. See, e.g., Henricksen, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
41. See, e.g., id. at 1162 (“This is not to say that where most diagnoses of a
disease are idiopathic it is impossible to prove specific causation.”).
42. Wade-Greaux, 874 F. Supp. at 1485 (noting that plaintiff’s experts “either
have not excluded or cannot exclude,” among other things, “those unknown
events that cause the great majority of birth defects.”).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c (2010) (“When the causes of a disease are largely unknown, however,
differential etiology is of little assistance.”); see also Henricksen, 605 F. Supp. 2d at
1149 (accepting as fact that eighty to ninety percent of all cases of plaintiff’s illness
are of idiopathic origin).
44. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic
Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 775, 792–93 (1997).
45. See, e.g., Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 668 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“The causes of Parkinson’s Disease range from the obscure to the unknown.”).
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46

knowledge. While science strives toward the perhaps unattainable
goal of identifying every cause of a plaintiff’s disease, the
percentage of cases attributed to unknown etiology will decline. At
what point is the residuum of unexplained disease small enough
for a court to conclude that an expert could rule out enough
alternative causes to be allowed to testify? To draw that line is to
define the set of cases in which even plaintiffs exposed to known
risk factors, rather than the defendants who do the exposing, bear
the cost of gaps in knowledge.
Ironically, the problem of unknown etiology inverts the
original dichotomy of general-versus-specific causation, in which
courts questioned whether group-based epidemiology could speak
47
to the cause of an individual plaintiff’s condition. Courts that
demand particularistic proof rely on a group-based characteristic, a
significant proportion of idiopathic cases, to support the inference
that the plaintiff has failed to introduce admissible and sufficient
48
proof of causation in an individual case.
Such reasoning may be valid—or not. Consider, for example,
the relation between asbestos and mesothelioma, frequently
49
described as a “signature” disease. Among persons not exposed to
50
asbestos, mesothelioma is vanishingly rare. As a consequence, the
relative risk for those exposed—the ratio of the incidence of
disease in the exposed population to its incidence in the
51
unexposed population—is extremely high. Nevertheless, sources
46. Id. (describing testimony that researchers recently discovered genetic and
environmental causes for forms of parkinsonism previously considered
idiopathic).
47. See supra Part II.A.
48. See supra notes 29, 30 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Torrejon v. Mobil Oil Co., 876 So. 2d 877, 892 (La. Ct. App.
2004); Anita Bernstein, Asbestos Achievements, 37 SW. U.L. REV. 691, 703 (2008);
Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1730–31 (2007).
50. In re Asbestos Litig., 900 A.2d 120, 132 (Del. Super. Ct. 2006)
(“[B]ackground incidence rate [of mesothelioma] is basically zero.”); Osteen v. A.
C. & S., Inc., 307 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Neb. 1981) (describing evidence that
“incidence of peritoneal mesothelioma is almost negligible in the population at
large,” estimated by plaintiff’s expert to be one in 10,000 deaths); Gerald W.
Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific Proof and
the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 294 (1993) (stating incidence
of mesothelioma in general population is approximately two per million).
51. See Osteen, 307 N.W.2d at 518 (noting that among asbestos workers,
incidence of mesothelioma is approximately seven percent); TOD ZUCKERMAN &
MARK RASKOFF, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE LITIGATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 26:5
n.5 (2010) (quoting MARK H. BEERS ET AL., THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6

1518

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

(including expert witnesses on both sides) report that asbestos
exposures do not appear to account for ten to twenty percent or
more of mesothelioma cases; such cases are generally considered
52
idiopathic and attributed to “no known cause.” The proportion
of idiopathic cases depends on two factors: the relative incidence of
mesothelioma among exposed versus unexposed individuals, and
the relative size of the exposed versus unexposed populations. If
half, one-quarter, or one-eighth as many people had been exposed
to asbestos at work, the percentage of all mesotheliomas not readily
attributable to asbestos would be two, four, or eight times higher
than it currently appears. Now that government regulation has
eliminated the types of occupational exposure that led to the
tragedy of asbestos workers’ illnesses, presumably a time will come
when virtually all of the (much lower) remaining incidence of
mesothelioma in the United States will be “idiopathic.” Assume
THERAPY 472 (Robert S. Porter & Thomas V. Jones eds., 18th ed. 2006)) (noting
that asbestos workers have up to ten percent lifetime risk of developing
mesothelioma); Irving Selikoff et al., Relationship Between Exposure to Asbestos and
Mesothelioma, 272 NEW ENG. J. MED. 560 (1965) (documenting extremely high
relative risk).
52. Becker v. Baron Bros., Coliseum Auto Parts, Inc., 649 A.2d 613, 618 (N.J.
1994) (reporting that plaintiff’s witness testified that fifteen percent of cases “have
no known cause,” and defendant’s witness testified that twenty to forty percent of
cases have “unknown causes”); see also In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129
B.R. 710, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that fifty to eighty percent of diagnosed
mesothelioma cases have history of asbestos exposure), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d
Cir. 1992), modified on reh’g, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993); Klima ex rel. Prior v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., Nos. A095614, A095640, A097693, A097697, 2003 WL
22172417, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2003) (noting that plaintiff’s witness
testified that twenty to thirty percent of cases in women and ten percent of cases in
men are considered idiopathic); Osteen, 307 N.W.2d at 518 (documenting that
studies show sixty to eighty percent of men dying of mesothelioma had prolonged
occupational exposure to asbestos); Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos
Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 527 (2009) (asserting that “there is wide agreement
that a significant number (by some estimates, twenty to thirty percent) of
mesotheliomas are not asbestos-induced”); Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental
Torts, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993) (noting that “well over ninety-percent” of
mesothelioma deaths are attributable to asbestos exposure); David C. Landin et
al., Lessons Learned from the Front Lines: A Trial Court Checklist for Promoting Order and
Sound Policy in Asbestos Litigation, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 589, 641 (2008) (reporting
estimate of ten to twenty percent of mesotheliomas caused by “non-asbestos
sources”).
Some controversy exists over whether cases without obvious
occupational exposure are truly idiopathic. See Becker, 649 A.2d at 618 (plaintiff’s
expert believed apparently idiopathic cases could be caused by asbestos in the
atmosphere, while acknowledging that other small fibers or radiation could also
cause mesothelioma); ZUCKERMAN & RASKOFF, supra note 51, at § 26:5 n.5
(suggesting that apparently idiopathic cases could be related to overlooked
exposures to asbestos).
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that at that time, a plaintiff sued who could prove significant
asbestos exposure and who offered a witness willing to testify to
specific causation based on epidemiologic studies and a differential
diagnosis. It is hard to imagine that any court would exclude the
proffered testimony because “the presence of a known risk factor is
not a sufficient basis for ruling out idiopathic origin in a particular
53
case . . . .”
If sufficient evidence exists to infer that an agent causes (some
of the cases of) a disease, the knowledge that an individual was
exposed to the agent alters the probability that the agent caused
that individual’s case. Assume a disease for which all cases are
either idiopathic or caused by exposure to agent X. For persons
not exposed to agent X, all cases are idiopathic. It follows that the
frequency of idiopathic cases among those exposed is lower than
among the population as a whole. So, even if population-based
data are treated as probability values in an individual case, it does
not follow that (for example) if more than half of the cases of a
disease are attributed to unknown causes, a plaintiff exposed to a
known causative agent could never prove that the exposure more
likely than not caused plaintiff’s disease.
For agent X, the results of epidemiologic investigation, if they
existed, would provide a population-based estimate of the extent to
54
which exposure had altered the incidence of disease. In the case
of asbestos, the powerful epidemiologic evidence linking exposure
to mesothelioma distinguishes the hypothetical future plaintiff
from many whose differential diagnoses were excluded because of a
high proportion of idiopathic cases. The hypotheticals nonetheless
demonstrate that what seems to be a specific causation problem of
particularistic proof embraces a problem of population-based proof
commonly associated with general causation. This brings us to the
judicial treatment of epidemiology and relative risk.

53. Henricksen v. Conoco Phillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1162 (E.D.
Wash. 2009).
54. Without epidemiologic data, a plaintiff would need to rely on other
relevant evidence to support an inference of causation, which might include
information about the extent of the plaintiff’s exposure, the frequency in the
population of exposure to the agent, and how convincingly exposure has been
ruled out in the studies that generated the reported rate of idiopathic disease. If
the hypothetical were relaxed to include the possibility of other known causes of
the disease in addition to agent X, a plaintiff might also produce evidence ruling
out those other known causes.
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B. Judicial Treatment of Epidemiology
Epidemiologists study the presence or absence of statistical
associations between diseases and putative causes.
Such
associations, if accompanied by confirmatory factors tending to
55
negate coincidence, can support an inference of a causal relation.
Two essential attributes of epidemiology have largely framed
judicial treatment of this science. Epidemiology’s key strength is
that its findings result from observation of living human beings.
Epidemiology’s key weakness is that its findings apply to the
populations of living human beings from which a study’s sample is
56
drawn, rather than to any individual human being.
These
fundamental characteristics led many courts to address
epidemiology from two seemingly contradictory directions. Courts
have asked: can a plaintiff prove causation without epidemiologic
support? Courts have also asked: can a plaintiff prove causation
with only epidemiologic support—and if so, what must that support
be?
From the first perspective, many courts have been leery of
inference from animal or in vitro studies as proof of general
57
causation. In the Agent Orange litigation, for example, the court
stated that epidemiologic studies of exposed human populations—
which in that case did not support plaintiffs’ allegation of
causation—were the “only useful studies having any bearing on
58
causation.”
Many other courts have similarly treated
55. Gary H. Spivey, The Epidemiological Method, in ENVIRONMENTAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY: EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS ON HUMAN HEALTH 9, 12–18
(William M. Draper ed., 1994).
56. In addition, the observational nature of epidemiology entails
methodology problems of bias and confounding that can affect the validity of
results, about which courts have sometimes expressed generalized concern. See
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 719 (Tex. 1997). For a
discussion of the methodology problems, see George Maldonado, Interpreting
Epidemiological Studies, in ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY: EFFECTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS ON HUMAN HEALTH 29, 30–37 (William M. Draper ed.,
1994).
57. See, e.g., Lynch v. Merrell-Nat’l Labs., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987)
(“Studies of this sort, singly or in combination, do not have the capability of
proving causation in human beings in the absence of any confirmatory
epidemiological data.”); Bell v. Swift Adhesives, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1577, 1579–81
(S.D. Ga. 1992) (rejecting as insufficient an expert opinion based predominantly
on animal studies).
58. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231–32
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[S]tudies to date conclude that there is as yet no
epidemiological evidence that paternal exposure to Agent Orange causes birth
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59

epidemiology as essential proof.
This view has been most
pronounced in cases where many epidemiologic studies exist that
did not find an association between the alleged causal agent and
60
the disease under study, but it has been stated in other situations
61
as well. Courts have been less likely to require epidemiology if
epidemiologic study of a particular alleged causal link is
impractical, if the alleged toxicity is acute, or if the exposure is
62
massive and idiosyncratic. But in many typical toxic tort cases—
defects and miscarriages . . . . Studies addressing the effect of Agent Orange
exposure on veterans’ health . . . have been negative or inconclusive.”).
59. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharms. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (non-epidemiologic studies, “singly or in combination, are not capable of
proving causation in human beings in the face of the overwhelming body of
contradictory epidemiological evidence.” (quoting Richardson v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,
Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 1989), modified on reh’g, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1989) (“[S]peculation unconfirmed by epidemiologic proof cannot form the basis
for causation in a court of law.”); see Wells v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 601 F.3d
375, 380 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[T]his court has frowned on causative conclusions
bereft of statistically significant epidemiological support.”).
60. The Bendectin and breast implant cases are notable examples. Raynor,
104 F.3d at 1374 (treating as “controlling” the “overwhelming” body of negative
results from epidemiologic study of Bendectin’s alleged teratogenicity); In re
Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (D. Colo. 1998) (excluding
testimony of plaintiffs’ general causation expert in part because of “a solid body of
epidemiologic evidence establishing that breast implants do not cause” plaintiffs’
conditions).
61. Burleson v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 585–86 (5th Cir.
2004) (affirming exclusion of plaintiff’s expert testimony and summary judgment
for defendant because “one of the few, if not the only” epidemiologic study failed
to find an association); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128
(2d Cir. 1995) (“[E]pidemiological evidence is indispensable in toxic and
carcinogenic tort actions where direct proof of causation is lacking.”); Bickel v.
Pfizer, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 918, 922 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (“Epidemiologic studies are
the primary, generally accepted methodology for demonstrating a causal relation
between a chemical and the set of symptoms or a disease.” (quoting Rains v. PPG
Indus. Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834 (S.D. Ill. 2004) (internal quotations
omitted)); Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 822 (W.D. Tex.
2005) (“Although Havner was a Bendectin case, [it] spoke generally about the use
of epidemiological evidence . . . and the Court does not read the opinion to limit
those principles solely to the Bendectin context.”); Chambers v. Exxon Corp., 81
F. Supp. 2d 661, 664–65 (M.D. La. 2000) (excluding testimony of plaintiffs’
causation experts because of lack of epidemiologic support for their opinions
while rejecting expert’s explanation that several studies’ failure to find statistically
significant associations resulted from rarity of plaintiffs’ condition).
62. See, e.g., Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 63 Fed. Cl. 765, 776–
79 (2005) (reversing dismissal despite lack of epidemiologic evidence where
plaintiff’s experts testified that hepatitis B vaccine could be expected to cause
Reye’s syndrome in manner similar to other vaccines and they had ruled out other
potential causes); Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir.
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involving diseases that occur at background rates in the population
and result from exposure only after a latency period—the presence
or absence of epidemiology can be critical. Even courts that do not
formally deem epidemiology essential frequently characterize it as
63
the “best” causation evidence.
From the second perspective, if epidemiology is essential or
nearly essential evidence, what must the epidemiologic data (if
believed) show to be sufficient to satisfy plaintiff’s burden of proof?
Epidemiologic studies report the extent to which exposure to a
suspected toxin appears to increase the incidence of a disease, that
is, the relative risk associated with exposure as compared to the
64
unexposed. Relative risk is a property of a group rather than an
individual plaintiff who unquestionably has a disease. Nevertheless,
1999) (affirming plaintiff’s judgment based on differential diagnosis and temporal
relationship despite lack of epidemiologic, animal, or in vitro evidence);
Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming plaintiff’s
judgment where both exposure and illness were so rare that epidemiologic study
was impossible); Bowers v. N. Telecom, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1004, 1010–11 (N.D. Fla.
1995) (holding that despite lack of “definitive” epidemiologic studies linking
keyboard use to repetitive stress injuries, the large body of less definitive
epidemiologic and other studies sufficed for admissibility and created material
issue of fact); Alder v. Bayer Corp., 61 P.3d 1068, 1084–85, 1089–90 (Utah 2002)
(reversing exclusion of plaintiff’s expert testimony and summary judgment for
defendant where plaintiff relied on differential diagnosis and temporal
relationship to show that fumes from improperly vented x-ray developing machine
caused mental impairment).
63. E.g., Beck v. Koppers, Inc., No. 3:03CV60-P-D, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25519, at *10 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 2, 2006) (regarding epidemiologic studies as the
best evidence even though they do not themselves “address the question of the
cause of an individual’s disease”); see also, e.g., Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295
F.3d 1194, 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that epidemiologic evidence is “not
required” but affirming district court’s exclusion of each of several other types of
evidence that plaintiffs contended were collectively sufficient to prove causation);
Ashburn v. Gen. Nutrition Ctrs., Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 770, 774 (N.D. Ohio 2008)
(excluding testimony for failure to explain choice of methodology other than
epidemiology); Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965 F. Supp. 49, 56, 58 (D.D.C.
1997) (calling lack of epidemiologic evidence “important” yet admitting plaintiff’s
expert causation testimony).
64. Epidemiologic results may be reported as any of several values, depending
on a study’s design: relative risk, odds ratio, attributable risk or attributable
fraction, standardized incidence ratio, or (if the studied outcome is death)
standardized mortality ratio. Although their computations differ, conceptually
these measures all describe the same thing, i.e. whether more disease is found in
those exposed than among those not exposed. Michael D. Green et al., Reference
Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 348–52
(2d ed. 2000) (describing relative risk, odds ratio, and attributable risk); see also
Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 591 n.7
(listing several epidemiologic measures).
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beginning with the swine flu vaccine cases that entailed the first
widespread use of epidemiology to address causation issues, courts
have equated more than a doubling of relative risk in an exposed
group to a more-likely-than-not probability of causation in an
65
exposed individual plaintiff.
This equation, combined with the rejection of general
causation inferences that are based on non-epidemiologic evidence
(such as animal studies), has substantive effect. It recasts the
burden of proving causation as a requirement to produce
epidemiologic evidence that satisfies the threshold. Courts hearing
many types of toxic tort cases have defined the causation element
66
in this way.
The substantive definition leads to evidentiary
consequences: courts have excluded expert testimony because the
testimony was unsupported by epidemiologic studies showing
67
relative risks greater than two.
65. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(“Whenever the relative risk to vaccinated persons is greater than two times the
risk to unvaccinated persons, there is a greater than [fifty-percent] chance that a
given GBS case among vaccinees of that latency period is attributable to
vaccination, thus sustaining plaintiff’s burden of proof on causation.”); Padgett v.
United States, 553 F. Supp. 794, 800–01 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (“From the relative risk,
we can calculate the probability that a given case of GBS was caused by
vaccination. . . . [A] relative risk of 2 or greater would indicate that it was more
likely than not that vaccination caused a case of GBS.”); see also In re “Agent
Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting that if
relative risk were not more than doubled, each plaintiff’s claim would fail under
preponderance standard).
66. Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, Relative Risk Greater than Two
in Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 195, 200 (2001)
(finding that relative risk of two is treated as threshold in approximately half of
judicial opinions that discussed the issue); see also, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med.
Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The threshold for concluding
that an agent more likely than not caused a disease is 2.0.”); Hall v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996) (stating that plaintiffs
must “demonstrate that exposure to breast implants more than doubled the risk”
of alleged injuries); In re W.R. Grace & Co., 355 B.R. 462, 483 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006) (requiring proof of relative risk greater than two to support property
damage claims based on unreasonable risks posed by asbestos-contaminated
insulation products).
67. See, e.g., Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1158
(E.D. Wash. 2009) (noting that under Ninth Circuit precedent, epidemiologic
studies may be probative of general causation but can prove specific causation only
if relative risk exceeds two); id. at 1175 (holding plaintiff’s expert testimony
inadmissible because epidemiologic evidence is “contradictory and inconsistent”);
Pozefsky v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 92-CV-0314, 2001 WL 967608, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2001) (excluding testimony in light of negative epidemiology;
sufficient epidemiologic proof requires relative risk greater than two); Watts v.
Radiator Specialty Co., 990 So. 2d 143, 150 (Miss. 2008) (affirming exclusion of
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The absence of epidemiologic proof of a relative risk greater
than two has been decisive even for courts that nominally resist
conflation of a relative risk threshold with the standard of
persuasion. It is one thing to permit non-epidemiologic evidence
to suffice in cases of exposures and afflictions so rare that
68
meaningful epidemiologic study is literally impossible. What if, as
is frequently the case, such study is possible but of limited statistical
69
70
In Dunn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., the plaintiff
power?
71
alleged that the drug Parlodel caused her stroke. Epidemiologic
studies showed the relative risk for recently postpartum women
who had taken Parlodel, compared to those who had not, was 8.4,
but strokes were so rare in both groups the result was not
72
statistically significant.
The plaintiff’s general causation expert
was prepared to testify that the exposure and disease satisfied all
the confirmatory factors epidemiologists usually rely on to confirm
73
the credibility of a causal inference from an observed association.
The court excluded the testimony, reasoning that the confirmatory
factors were irrelevant absent a statistically significant
epidemiologic result—even though the court also stated that

testimony based in part on lack of statistically significant epidemiology); cf. City of
San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2009) (testimony admitted
without objection held insufficient as matter of law). But see Allen v. Martin
Surfacing, 263 F.R.D. 47, 56 (D. Mass. 2008) (admitting causation testimony to be
tested by adversary process, rather than excluded altogether, despite paucity of
epidemiologic evidence); King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24,
46–47 (Neb. 2009) (“In short, significance of epidemiological studies with weak
positive associations is a question of weight, not admissibility.”).
68. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998). In
Zuchowicz, the plaintiff’s wife died of primary pulmonary hypertension (PPH) after
receiving a massive overdose of the drug Danocrine. Id. at 384. The district court
admitted testimony by plaintiff’s causation experts, a physician and a
pharmacologist. Id. at 385. Defendant argued that the testimony was both
inadmissible and insufficient. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment for
plaintiff, in part because “[t]he number of persons who received this type of
overdose was simply too small for the plaintiff to be able to provide
epidemiological, or even anecdotal, evidence linking PPH to Danocrine
overdoses.” Id.
69. Statistical power, a measure of a study’s ability to rule out random error as
a source of an observed association between exposure and disease, is a function of
the size of the sample and the size of the effect being measured. Kaye &
Freedman, supra note 7, at 125–26.
70. 275 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
71. Id. at 675.
72. Id. at 680.
73. Id. at 676–79.
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74

epidemiologic proof is not required to prove causation.
Courts that denied imposing a minimum relative risk
threshold have meant less than they have said in other ways as well.
Some courts have said that a relative risk greater than one, but less
than two, is evidence of general causation but insufficient to prove
75
specific causation. This distinction is unlikely to matter, however,
in the typical case where particularistic proof of specific causation is
76
inherently impossible. Similarly, courts have said that a relative
risk less than two may be sufficient—if it is supplemented by other
77
evidence. Such statements, however, have tended to appear in
the context of a finding that although such supplementation is
permissible in principle, the plaintiff failed to achieve it in the case
78
at bar.
Finally, even courts that do not insist on proof of a doubling of
risk nevertheless treat epidemiologic studies that do not
79
demonstrate increased risk as definitive disproof of causation.
74. Id. at 677–81, 684. The Kentucky Supreme Court, in another Parlodel
case, criticized Dunn and similarly-reasoned decisions “as incorrectly requiring
scientific certainty, which was not intended by Daubert.” Hyman & Armstrong,
P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Ky. 2008).
75. In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 524 F.
Supp. 2d 1166, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp.
1151, 1160 (E.D. La. 1997).
76. See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 881 (explaining that both the “strong”
version of preponderance rule—requiring particularistic evidence—and the
“weak” version—requiring only relative risk greater than two—result in aggregate
under-compensation if less than fifty percent of disease is attributed to exposure).
77. See also Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. v. E..I. DuPont, 292 F.3d 1124,
1137 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen available, known individual risk factors are also
relevant” in addition to relative risk results from epidemiologic studies); cf. Estate
of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 381 (Vt. 2010) (paying
lip service to idea that “some other evidence” besides epidemiologic report of
relative risk greater than two could prove specific causation, but dismissing as
unscientific plaintiff’s expert’s attempt to rely on such evidence).
78. E.g., Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 381; Pafford v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 451 F. 3d 1352, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
79. See, e.g., Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. v. E.I. DuPont, 534 F.3d 986,
1011, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming exclusion of expert’s proffered testimony
that epidemiologic studies failing to show causation do not preclude causation);
Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275, at
*29 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (“[I]t is essential that any demonstration of causation
. . . compare the prevalence . . . among those who took the drugs and a similarlysituated population of others who did not.”); id. at *177 (“[A]t least four
epidemiologic studies confirmed that fenfluramines did not produce an increased
risk of tricuspid regurgitation.”); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. 1223, 1231–32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (dismissing claims of plaintiffs who had
opted out of class action), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
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That conclusion is supportable if it is based on multiple, large, welldesigned studies, but it is not logically compelled in every case.
Confounding factors and methodological flaws leading to biased
results can obscure real associations just as they can generate
spurious associations. Moreover, a study’s limited statistical power,
rather than the absence of a genuine association, may lead to
statistically insignificant results that courts treat as disproof of
causation, particularly in situations without the large study samples
80
that result from mass exposures. Very few courts have recognized
81
these possibilities.
By contrast, many courts have imposed extremely strict
standards on epidemiologic proof used to support a causal
82
inference. The “high-water mark” of such decisions was a
83
Bendectin case decided by the Texas Supreme Court, Merrell Dow
84
Pharmaceuticals v. Havner. Although the court denied that it was
85
using relative risk greater than two as a “litmus test,”
Havner effectively imposed that threshold as a substantive
86
requirement for a toxic tort plaintiff’s proof of causation. At the
80. See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 7, at 125–26 (defining statistical power
and explaining that power “depends on the size of the effect and the size of the
sample”); see also Smith v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 684, 693
(W.D.N.C. 2003) (“[T]he concept of power is key because it’s helpful in evaluating
whether the study’s outcome . . . is exonerative or inconclusive.”).
81. See, e.g., Cooley v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 693 F. Supp. 2d 767, 774 (N.D. Ohio
2010) (ruling that court would admit testimony that epidemiologic studies had not
found statistically significant associations, but “will not allow any witness to opine
that epidemiological studies . . . are evidence of an absence of an association . . .
unless the witness has performed a methodologically reliable analysis” of the
studies’ statistical power to support that conclusion); Smith, 278 F. Supp. 2d at
692–93 (refusing to conclude that epidemiologic study showing no increased risk
disproved causation because very small number of cases of disease meant study
had low statistical power).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28
cmt. c (2010).
83. Bendectin was a drug prescribed to treat morning sickness in pregnant
women. Many plaintiffs alleged that Bendectin caused birth defects in children
whose mothers took the drug. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS
2–3 (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT
LITIGATION 1–2 (1998). The Bendectin cases are discussed in Part III.C. See infra
notes 194–209 and accompanying text.
84. 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
85. Id. at 718.
86. See id. at 717–18 (referring to “requirement of more than a doubling of
the risk”). In context, the “litmus test” remark emphasized that even if such
epidemiologic data existed, it still might not satisfy plaintiff’s burden. Id. at 718
(“We do not hold . . . that a relative risk of more than 2.0 is a litmus test or that a
single epidemiological test is legally sufficient evidence of causation. Other factors
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same time, the Texas Supreme Court worried about using
87
population-based data to infer causation in an individual case, and
therefore imposed stringent “reliability” conditions on the use of
epidemiologic studies—including a specific standard of statistical
88
significance, and, perhaps most important, a requirement that a
plaintiff “must show that he or she is similar to those in the
89
studies.”
On its face, the similarity requirement simply expresses the
unremarkable view that evidence must be relevant. Judicial
interpretation of the similarity requirement, however, is critical, for
it confines an expert witness’s ability to rely on data in support of
inferences of causation. Havner, for example, stated that the
similarity showing would require, among other things, proof that
the injured person’s “exposure or dose levels were comparable to
or greater than those in the studies,” apparently ruling out any
inference based upon a lower exposure and a dose-response
90
relationship.
Havner treated the similarity requirement as an issue of
evidentiary reliability. Most federal courts (and state courts that
apply Daubert) address such issues under the rubric of evidentiary
91
“fit,” which empowers the court as gatekeeper to decide whether
the purported basis for an expert’s conclusion is sufficiently
92
supportive or whether it leaves an “analytical gap” too wide to
must be considered.”). Most lower Texas courts and federal courts applying Texas
law have construed Havner to require relative risk greater than two. E.g., Lofton v.
McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharms., 682 F. Supp. 2d 662, 668 (N.D. Texas
2010); Wells v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. A-06-CA-126-LY, 2009 WL 564303,
at *8 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2009); Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d
814, 821–22 (W.D. Tex. 2005); Exxon Corp. v. Makofski, 116 S.W.3d 176, 182–83,
188 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Atterbury, 978 S.W.2d 183,
198–99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
87. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 715, 718 (describing relative risk greater than two
rule as “balance between the needs of our legal system and the limits of science”).
88. The court embraced the ninety-five percent statistical significance
convention, holding that for expert opinion based on an epidemiologic study to
be admissible, the ninety-five percent confidence interval around the study’s
reported relative risk must not include a relative risk equal to one (i.e., no effect).
Id. at 724.
89. Id. at 720.
90. See id.
91. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993)
(explaining concept of “fit”).
92. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 137–38 (1997) (describing
“analytical gap”); see also id. at 152–53 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (agreeing that proffered evidence did not “fit” but disagreeing
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93

allow the expert to testify. Courts, explicitly or implicitly, have
invoked a lack of fit to support the dispositive exclusion of expert
causation testimony in many factual contexts and for many
94
different reasons.
Many of these jurisprudential threads came together in the
Vermont Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in a worker’s
compensation case, Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities &
95
Towns. A firefighter’s estate alleged that he had contracted nonHodgkin’s lymphoma (NHL) as a result of exposure to carcinogens
96
while fighting fires. The worker’s compensation agency denied
the claim for failure to prove a causal relation between the
97
firefighter’s employment and his illness. The estate appealed to
the trial court, which excluded the estate’s proffered expert
98
By a 2-1-2 vote, the Vermont Supreme Court
testimony.
99
affirmed.

that it was unreliable).
93. See Sanders, supra note 20, at 1037–38 (noting importance of “fit” in court
opinions).
94. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315–17 (11th Cir.
1999) (affirming exclusion of testimony in breast implant case, where testimony
would have been based on animal studies of injected silicone and on four
epidemiologic studies, but twenty epidemiologic studies found no association);
Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming exclusion
of testimony based on animal studies because expert could not testify that
chronology observed in animal models had occurred in plaintiff); Soldo v. Sandoz
Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 568, 572 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (rejecting studies of
related chemicals, animal models, or different diseases); Kerns v. Hobart Bros.
Co., No. 2007 CA 32, 2008 WL 1991909, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. May 9, 2008)
(affirming exclusion of testimony for lack of epidemiologic study of plaintiff’s
industry, despite in vitro studies and epidemiologic studies of workers in other
industries); Valentine v. PPG Indus., Inc., 821 N.E.2d 580, 595–96 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004) (rejecting inference from animal studies); In re BP Amoco Chem. Co., No.
14-06-00778-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 446, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007)
(“Unless a plaintiff can show that he could qualify as a member of the exposed
study group, an epidemiological study is irrelevant and misleading to the jury.”
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591)). See generally Smith v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co.,
278 F. Supp. 2d 684, 691 n.10 (W.D.N.C. 2003) (“The term ‘fit’ refers to the
relationship of an epidemiological study to the facts of the case and the issues in
dispute and involves evaluating the study’s probative value.”).
95. Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367 (Vt. 2010).
96. Id. at 369.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 370.
99. The concurring justice agreed with the plurality’s analysis but considered
the case “more as an adequacy-of-proof case than an admissibility-of-evidence
case.” Id. at 382 (Dooley, J., concurring).
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The extent of the firefighter’s actual exposure to carcinogens
was unknown and unknowable—no one had sampled and recorded
the constituents of what he breathed while on the job. His estate
relied on epidemiologic investigation of a suspected association
100
between the firefighting profession and incidence of NHL.
Claimant’s experts referred to eight published studies, all of which
reported elevated risks, though only some were statistically
101
significant.
Two of the studies reported statistically significant
102
relative risks greater than two.
One of plaintiff’s experts
performed a meta-analysis which “found the summary risk estimate
103
for NHL to be 1.51.”
The Vermont Supreme Court majority appeared willing to
agree that this evidence might suffice to establish general
104
causation, but Vermont “law requires claimant to show, not
merely that firefighting increased the likelihood of injury, but that
105
it more likely than not caused his disease.” The judicial suspicion
of inferences from group-based epidemiology to opinions about
individual cases reverberated: “the very use of epidemiological
evidence to show specific causation reflects a compromise, given
that epidemiological studies ‘cannot indicate the actual cause of a
106
given individual’s disease or condition.’”
Thus the court
approved the trial judge’s use of relative risk greater than two as a
“benchmark” that “easily tied into Vermont’s ‘more likely than not’
107
civil standard.”
Because the epidemiologic studies “reflected
108
widely varying degrees of relative risk” and only two of the eight
100. Id. at 373.
101. Id. at 381.
102. Id. at 387 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 381. This figure would imply that just over one-third of all cases of
NHL in a population of firefighters could be attributed to occupational exposures
if the association were accepted as causal. Application of the relative risk greater
than two threshold would mean that none of these firefighters received worker’s
compensation.
104. See id. at 376 (describing trial court finding that proof of “general
association” did not prove “that claimant’s work . . . actually caused him to develop
NHL”); id. at 381 (“A conclusion that NHL is considered a ‘probable cancer risk’
for firefighters is not sufficient to establish that claimant’s NHL was caused by
firefighting . . . .”).
105. Id. at 381.
106. Id. at 377 (quoting Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706,
718 (Tex. 1997)).
107. Id. at 375; see also id. at 378 (“[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion
in considering a relative risk greater than 2.0 as a reasonable and helpful
benchmark under the circumstances presented here.”).
108. Id. at 375.
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had statistically significant results showing more than a doubling of
the risk, the court affirmed the exclusion of claimant’s causation
testimony and the resulting summary judgment in favor of the
109
insurer.
The term “benchmark” suggests something less than
“requirement,” but it is far from clear what additional evidence the
claimant might have introduced to vault the court’s relative risk
threshold. As the dissent noted, claimant’s experts would have
testified that several factors supported the inference that this
particular firefighter faced higher occupational NHL risk than the
110
average firefighter studied by the epidemiologists.
The majority
held, in effect, that none of this mattered, in light of epidemiologic
111
evidence deemed insufficient.
The holding demonstrates one
consequence of the relative risk greater than two threshold: if an
epidemiologic study’s result satisfies the threshold requirement but
a personal characteristic distinguishes a plaintiff from the members
of the study’s exposed sample group, courts reject the result as
112
irrelevant to the particular plaintiff; but if an epidemiologic
study’s result does not meet the threshold, a plaintiff’s personal
characteristic cannot supply the needed increment of relative risk.
The Estate of George dissent also questioned the majority’s
conclusion that the wide range of reported relative risks favored
113
Variability in reported
exclusion of the proffered testimony.
114
relative risks is common, and should be expected in any study
109. Id. at 375, 382.
110. Id. at 384 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting). The reasons advanced included: the
number of years claimant had been a firefighter, the fact that his career included
many years in which firefighters rarely used protective equipment, the type of
NHL he had, and an analysis, akin to a differential diagnosis, that ruled out
certain other risk factors. Id. at 393–94.
111. Id. at 376 (“To meet his burden of proof, claimant relied on
epidemiological studies, studies that focus on general causation rather than
specific causation.”); id. at 392–93 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that claimant
did not rely only on epidemiology).
112. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 720 (Tex.
1997).
113. Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 397 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting).
114. W. C. HUEPER, OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CANCERS OF THE
URINARY SYSTEM 118–19, 156 tbl.48 (1969) (describing studies reporting relative
risks for bladder cancer among dye industry workers that ranged from 30 to 47 in
early studies and 8.7 to 17 in studies conducted after production methods were
changed to reduce toxic exposure); Yih-Horng Shiao, Genetic Signature for Human
Risk Assessment: Lessons from Trichloroethylene, 50 ENVTL. & MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS
68, 72–73 (2009) (noting the epidemiology linking trichloroethylene to kidney
cancer has been “inconsistent”).
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involving statistical sampling. The dissent wondered: if multiple
epidemiologic studies exist, what percentage must show a relative
115
risk greater than two to form a basis for an expert opinion?
Echoing a criticism also found in legal scholarship, the dissent
complained that the majority’s “2.0 standard . . . requires each
study to prove that claimant should win on the merits” rather than
allowing a claimant to combine pieces of supporting evidence to
116
meet the preponderance standard of proof.
The evidentiary and substantive rules illustrated in Estate of
George and the opinions of many other courts differentially allocate
to plaintiffs the cost of scientific uncertainty. By limiting legally
admissible and sufficient proof to a specific category and strength
of scientific results, these courts hold that plaintiffs must bear the
cost of toxic injury uncompensated during the time when science is
developing evidence but has not yet produced the judicially
mandated results.
The treatment of epidemiologic uncertainty in Estate of George
is a perfect example. Two of eight studies resulted in a statistically
significant relative risk above the court’s “benchmark” value of
117
two.
The opinion does not suggest that those studies suffered
118
from some methodological flaw.
Nevertheless, the studies were
held not just insufficient to satisfy the claimant’s burden and to
raise a disputed issue of material fact, but insufficient even to
provide enough support to allow an expert opinion to be
119
admissible.
In effect, the court held that the studies had no

115. Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 392–93, 397 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 387; see also Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse:
How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation
Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336 (1999) (“Judges have applied Daubert to subject
each item of expert proof proffered by plaintiffs to substantive causation law
scrutiny, to see if it, standing alone, would prove both general and specific
causation.”); Susan Haack, Proving Causation: The Holism of Warrant and the Atomism
of Daubert, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 253, 272–73 (2008) (noting that, as an
epistemological matter, “combined evidence may indeed warrant a causal
conclusion better than any of its components”); McGarity, supra note 14, at 19–23
(noting that the judicial “corpuscular” approach, which emphasizes deficiencies of
each piece of supporting scientific evidence, precludes use of “weight-of-theevidence approach” used by regulatory agencies in their decision-making to
“protect[] citizens from toxic risks”).
117. See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
118. Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 373 n.5 (noting that studies on which plaintiff
relied, among others, were collected and described in a published literature
review).
119. See supra notes 92, 94 and accompanying text.
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120

probative value at all.
When courts thus decide, in effect, that scientifically debatable
121
conclusions are legally false, they do not simply restate that a
plaintiff bears the burden of proof. They apply the preponderance
standard in a way that does not treat errors equally but instead
prefers false negatives over false positives.
Estate of George is all the more remarkable because the majority
had to dance around its own precedent from a unanimous opinion
just two years old that reversed a trial court’s decision to exclude
122
expert testimony that a defective microwave oven caused a fire.
The earlier opinion criticized the trial judge for focusing too much
on the expert’s conclusions rather than on the methodology used
123
to reach the conclusions. Emphasizing the “‘liberal thrust’ of the
rules of evidence,” the court cautioned that consideration of expert
testimony’s admissibility should not serve “as a preliminary inquiry
124
into the merits of the case.”
The dissent in Estate of George
125
In the
accused the majority of endorsing just such an inquiry.
Vermont Supreme Court and many other courts, it seems, claims of
120. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997)
(“While Rule 702 deals with the admissibility of evidence, it offers substantive
guidelines in determining if the expert testimony is some evidence of probative
value.”).
121. See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137, 146
(D. Mass. 2009) (holding that expert testimony must be excluded as unreliable if
expert’s conclusion is subject to scientific debate and the consensus is “[w]e don’t
know”), rev’d, No. 09-2270, 2011 WL 982385 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2011); see also Susan
Haack, Federal Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction—and a Reconstruction, 5 N.Y.U. J.
L. & LIBERTY 394, 412 (2010) (criticizing Daubert for conflating “scientific” with
“reliable”). For discussion of the First Circuit’s opinion in Milward, see infra Part
IV.D.2.
122. 985 Assocs. v. Daewoo Elecs. Am., Inc., 945 A.2d 381, 382 (Vt. 2008). The
composition of the Vermont Supreme Court did not change in the time between
985 Associates and Estate of George. See Vermont Supreme Court Justices’ Biographies,
VERMONTJUDICIARY.ORG,
http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/GTC/Supreme
/JusticesBios.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).
123. 985 Assocs., 945 A.2d at 385, 387 (“[T]he trial court’s reasoning was flawed
with regard to its determination that plaintiffs’ expert opinions were unreliable
and therefore inadmissible” because the court “focus[ed] on the conclusions
drawn by the experts, rather than on the reliability of the underlying facts and
methodology employed in reaching those conclusions.”). Those who think courts
too readily exclude toxic tort causation witnesses often echo this criticism. Finley,
supra note 116, at 342–44; Haack, supra note 116, at 260.
124. 985 Assocs., 945 A.2d at 385.
125. Estate of George v. Vermont League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 383
(Vt. 2010) (Reiber, C.J., dissenting) (“[B]oth the trial court and the majority have
exceeded their proper roles in this case and evaluated the evidence put forward by
claimant to determine whether claimant should ultimately prevail on the merits.”).
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toxic tort causation have received special scrutiny. What explains
that?
III. WHY DOES THE FALSE NEGATIVE ASYMMETRY EXIST, AND IS IT
JUSTIFIED?
The judicial preference for false negatives in toxic causation
claims is never expressly acknowledged and only rarely implicitly
explained. Searching for the causes of and justifications for the
false negative asymmetry, then, is to some degree an inherently
speculative enterprise. This Part assesses rationales that can be
inferred from judicial and scholarly writings.
Might plaintiffs’ problems in toxic tort cases simply reflect a
systemic judicial bias in favor of a politically conservative, probusiness, anti-plaintiff ideology? Few would question that, for
example, the judges who compose the federal bench are on
average more politically conservative today than they were thirty
126
years ago.
Nevertheless, the judicial ideology explanation falls
short because, heuristically, toxic tort causation rulings do not
seem to break along political lines of division.
The principal holdings of the three major Supreme Court
opinions on expert testimony “gatekeeping,” for example, were all
127
supported by unanimous courts. Justice Stevens dissented in part
from all three holdings, but the other members of the Court’s
128
“liberal” wing did not join him. In Joiner and Kumho he was alone,
arguing in each case that the Court needlessly went beyond the
legal question presented to decide that the district court had not
abused its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s proffered expert
129
testimony.
In Daubert—a Bendectin case—Justice Stevens joined
126. See Michael Waldman, A Brewing Court Battle, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 14, 2009,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2009/03/13/a-brewing-court-battle.html
(“For the past quarter century, the courts have been conservative . . . .”).
127. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 139–40 (1999) (unanimous
with a dissent in part by Justice Stevens); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,
137–38 (1997) (unanimous with a dissent in part by Justice Stevens); Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993) (unanimous with a dissent in
part by Justice Stevens).
128. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2007 (Magazine) (noting that in the immediately preceding Supreme
Court term, “[t]he four more liberal justices were often moved to dissent in
unusually personal and vehement terms” and describing Justice Stevens as
“arguably [the] most liberal justice”).
129. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Joiner, 522 U.S. at 154–55
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s partial dissent from the majority’s
articulation of “general observations” concerning the types of
considerations that might guide district courts trying to decide
130
whether to admit expert testimony.
Their dissent famously
warned that the Court, unwisely, was forcing judges to become
131
“amateur scientists” in deciding admissibility disputes.
Even before the Supreme Court’s Daubert opinion, every
federal appellate court that considered the causation issue in a
Bendectin case had rejected the plaintiffs’ claim. The majority of
judges involved in those decisions were appointed by President
Reagan, but the few who were appointed by Democratic presidents
132
did not disagree.
Similarly, it is not difficult to find cases, after
Daubert and Joiner, in which judges appointed by Democrats
adopted restrictive views of causation evidence and judges
133
appointed by Republicans were more accepting.
The riven Fifth
130. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598–601 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting). Electronic
database searches of the Court’s opinions showed that Daubert is one of only
eleven instances in which a dissenting or partially dissenting opinion was joined by
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens and no other Justices.
131. Id. at 600–01.
132. For a chronological list of forty-nine appellate Bendectin opinions,
representing thirty-four Bendectin cases, see SANDERS supra note 83, at 156, 157
tbl.15 (1998). The list includes seven decisions of federal courts of appeals before
the Daubert Supreme Court opinion. See id. at 157 tbl.15. Publically available
information about these judges and their appointing presidents shows that of the
twenty-one judges on those seven panels (including two sitting by designation),
eleven were appointed to their then-current seats by President Reagan, and only
six were appointed by Democrats. The latter six included the following judges: (1)
the author of one of the earliest cases, Richardson ex rel. Richardson v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming defendant’s judgment
notwithstanding the verdict); (2) all three judges on the unanimous ruling, later
cited by the Supreme Court, of Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d
1349, 1350 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming defendant’s summary judgment); and (3) a
member of a panel that issued a per curiam opinion that followed the Turpin
precedent, Lee v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 91-5369, 1992 WL 92750, at *2 (6th
Cir. Apr. 22, 1992) (per curiam). Two of the seven appeals affirmed judgments
for defendants that had been entered by district judges appointed by President
Carter. SANDERS, supra note 83, at 157 tbl.15.
133. Compare Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1178
(E.D. Wash. 2009) (judge appointed by Democratic president excludes plaintiff’s
experts’ testimony for lack of fit and failure to assess possible particularistic
evidence), with Allen v. Martin Surfacing, 263 F.R.D. 47, 64 (D. Mass. 2009) (judge
appointed by Republican president holds that defendant’s attacks on plaintiff’s
experts’ methodology and conclusions go to the weight, rather than admissibility,
of the evidence); see Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Group, Inc., No. 09-2270,
2011 WL 982385 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2011) (unanimous court of appeals panel
consisting of two judges appointed by President Clinton and one judge appointed
by President G.W. Bush reverse exclusion of plaintiffs’ expert by district judge
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Circuit in Huss v. Gayden provides an interesting example of a split
134
The same non-pattern
that did not strictly follow party lines.
appears in the opinions of state courts. The Texas Supreme Court
135
took a restrictive view of causation evidence, but so did the
Vermont Supreme Court—with one of two Republican-appointed
136
justices and one of three Democrat-appointed justices dissenting.
The highest courts in Nebraska and Kentucky rejected arguments
137
The political party of a judge’s
for similarly restrictive views.
appointing executive is an imperfect ideological proxy, and these
results are impressionistic rather than comprehensive, but they
suggest that more than political ideology is at play in toxic tort
138
causation decisions.

appointed by President Clinton).
134. Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, 585 F.3d
823 (2009). A panel majority, consisting of one appointee of President George
H.W. Bush and one appointee of President George W. Bush, reversed the
plaintiff’s jury verdict, holding—over a dissent by an appointee of President
Reagan—that the exclusion of a defense expert on causation had been an abuse of
discretion. Huss, 571 F.3d at 455–56 (holding exclusion was reversible error
meriting a new trial); id. at 463 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Nine judges
dissented from the denial of panel rehearing en banc. Huss, 585 F.3d at 827
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting); id. at 833 (Elrod, J., dissenting). All of the judges
who voted against the rehearing were appointed by Republican presidents. All
four judges on the court who were appointed by Democratic presidents dissented
from the denial of rehearing—joined by four appointees of Republican
presidents.
135. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714–20 (Tex.
1997) (setting forth various requirements for scientific evidence of toxic tort
causation); see supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text (analyzing Havner).
136. See Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 382
(Vt. 2010); see id. at 383 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting); supra notes 95–116 and
accompanying text (analyzing Estate of George).
137. See Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 105 (Ky.
2008) (“Daubert does not require proof to a scientific certainty, or even proof
convincing to the trial judge. The trial judge is not required to find that the
proffered opinion is scientifically correct, but only that it is trustworthy . . . .”);
King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 42–43 (Neb. 2009)
(“[R]easonable differences in scientific evaluation should not exclude an expert
witness’ opinion. The trial court’s role as evidentiary gatekeeper is not intended
to replace the adversary system . . . .”).
138. See Tracy E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1651–53 (1998) (stating that the
appointing president’s political party is “a good proxy for a justice’s attitudes”).
But see Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic
Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 793–94 (2005) (“[A]t least
at the lower federal court level, ideology explains only part of judicial behavior
and tends to emerge in certain narrowly defined sets of cases in studies designed
to tease out those marginal effects.”).
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Courts that erect high sufficiency thresholds and narrow
admissibility walls for toxic tort causation evidence frequently
exhibit heightened sensitivity to the truth-seeking function of law
139
and emphasize the goal of accurate fact-finding. The issue is why
this sensitivity should take the form of decision rules that create
asymmetrical risks of error.
A. The Science Rationale: Courts as Serfs of Statistics
Our courts take for granted that deciding a toxic causation
dispute is inherently beyond the ken of lay people and therefore
140
Because the testimony is
demands expert scientific testimony.
scientific, courts often conflate resolution of these legal disputes
141
with a search for scientific truth, although the epistemic nature
142
and systemic goals of legal and scientific inquiry diverge.
Framing disputes as scientific creates the expectation, sometimes
139. See Sanders, supra note 20, at 1045–47.
140. E.g., Allison v. McGahn Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding expert testimony required because causal connection “is not a natural
inference that a juror could make through human experience.”); Henricksen v.
ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1177 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (“Expert
testimony is necessary . . . since this is a toxic tort lawsuit.”). Other approaches are
conceivable. In a medical malpractice case, the Supreme Court of Canada
affirmed a finding that an ophthalmologist’s negligence caused atrophy of the
plaintiff’s optic nerve even though plaintiff suffered from other conditions known
to cause atrophy and the expert witnesses could not “express with certainty an
opinion as to what caused the atrophy in this case . . . .” Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2
S.C.R. 311, para. 7 (Can.). For a generalized defense of that outcome, see Brown,
supra note 2, at 35 (arguing that “[n]either the existence of an evidentiary gap nor
scientific demurral from bridging that gap excuses the fact-finder from
proceeding further in the causal inquiry. Reliance on scientific demurral as being
determinative is, quite literally, unjust.”); see also Gass v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc.,
558 F.3d 419, 434 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming exclusion of plaintiffs’ doctors’
causation opinions, but reversing summary judgment for defendant, because a
jury could rationally find for plaintiffs if it believed plaintiffs’ testimony that they
suffered immediate and lasting illness after exposure to a cloud of pesticide
sprayed in their hotel room); Genna v. Jackson, 781 N.W.2d 124, 129–30 (Mich.
App. 2009) (holding expert causation testimony unnecessary where children
developed symptoms after mold grew in home and recovered when the children
were removed from the home), appeal denied, 783 N.W.2d 350 (2010).
141. Sanders, supra note 20, at 1045.
142. See, e.g., CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS 207–15 (2006) (describing tensions
between scientific and legal goals and epistemic practices); Troyen A. Brennan,
Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in HazardousSubstance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 471 (1988) (“Legal notions of
causation, however, differ in important ways from scientific causal concepts.”);
Walker, supra note 2, at 1096 (noting that legal fact-finding must satisfy policies
and goals not applicable to science).
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illusive, that an objectively correct, indisputable answer is
143
This “scientific turn” of toxic tort causation
available.
144
jurisprudence
cannot be separated from the tendency to
privilege litigation’s truth-seeking function at the expense of other
legitimate functions; the two trends reflect and reinforce each
145
other.
As one judge, melding the concepts, argued: “[c]ourts
146
must be arbiters of truth, not junk science and guesswork.”
If, as some have charged, many courts equate “preponderance
of the evidence” of toxic causation with scientific certainty of
147
causation, that provides some accounting for the false negative
asymmetry. A rule that demands certainty necessarily would lead to
false negatives by excluding even probable but uncertain positive
findings.
Courts, naturally, do not acknowledge demanding certainty,
and when they inadvertently sound like they do, they correct
themselves. For example, when an appellate panel in a Bendectin
case found “the lack of conclusive epidemiological proof to be fatal”
to plaintiffs’ case, on petition for rehearing it instead found fatal
plaintiffs’ “failure to present statistically significant epidemiological
148
proof.”
The word substitution achieved quite a transmutation.
143. The same illusion is said to afflict jurors in criminal cases who suffer from
the “CSI effect.” See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction
About Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47
JURIMETRICS J. 357 (2007) (testing the hypothesis that television shows highlighting
forensic science make jurors less inclined to convict if the prosecution presents no
scientific evidence and/or more inclined to convict if the prosecution presents any
scientific evidence).
144. Sanders, supra note 20, at 1045; see also SANDERS, supra note 83, at 159–60
(tracing shift in appellate decisions in Bendectin cases from “legalistic” view less
likely to resolve conflicts between experts to “scientific” view tending to scrutinize
the basis for expert opinions and rule on causation as a matter of law).
145. See Sanders, supra note 20, at 1045. For criticism of the high value courts
place on truth-seeking in toxic tort litigation, see Brown, supra note 2, at 18–20,
23–24 and CRANOR, supra note 142, at 349.
146. Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 460 (5th Cir. 2009) (plurality opinion).
147. E.g., Hyman & Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 104 (Ky.
2008) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to trial court’s admission of plaintiff’s
expert testimony on causation and criticizing rejection of similar evidence by
other courts “as incorrectly requiring scientific certainty, which was not intended
by Daubert”).
148. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 884 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added). Another example is In re Joint S. & E. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52
F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that district court had held that plaintiff
could introduce proof of causation sufficient to reach jury “either through studies
conclusively establishing” relative risk greater than two or through epidemiologic
evidence of relative risk less than two combined with particularistic evidence
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The court’s original sentence appeared to abandon the
preponderance standard in favor of a demand for evidence
stronger even than that required for a criminal conviction. The
rephrased sentence amounted to a nearly banal statement that the
court would not accept, as evidence of an effect, a result that did
not satisfy the scientific convention for acceptance of evidence of
an effect.
The scientific convention begins with the null hypothesis—the
assumption that an effect under investigation does not exist—and
demands proof that it is very unlikely an observed difference
between two samples would have been found had the parametric
values been the same in the two populations from which the
149
samples were drawn.
“Very improbably” conventionally has
150
Statistical
meant a probability of less than five-percent.
significance testing helps scientists avoid Type I error (incorrectly
rejecting a null hypothesis that is true), but conveys no information
about the probability of a Type II error (incorrectly failing to reject
151
a null hypothesis that is false).
The latter can be quite high,
152
depending on the statistical power of feasible research designs.
Implicit in scientists’ choice to avoid Type I error and tolerate a
risk of Type II error is the assumption that if an investigated effect
really exists, it will eventually be demonstrated by repeated, and
153
preferably improved or enlarged, studies.
strengthening the causal inference).
149. This is typically represented as “P < .05,” and is equivalent to “statistical
significance at the 95% level.” Lower values of P provide greater confidence in
rejection of the null hypothesis. See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 7, at 122.
150. See id. at 124.
151. Id. at 125–26, 168, 172–73; Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson,
Significant Statistics: The Unwitting Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37
PEPP. L. REV. 771, 825 (2010).
152. See Kaye & Freedman, supra note 7, at 125–26 (explaining that subtle
effects require large sample sizes for detection).
153. This discussion is not intended to suggest that a court’s refusal to admit
expert opinion based on study results that are not statistically significant is
equivalent to imposing a heightened standard of persuasion that demands 95%
certainty. No scientist would consider a result that is “significant” at the 51% level
(P < .49) to mean that it is “more likely than not” that an observed difference
between two samples reflected a real difference between the parametric values in
the population: such a result would be obtained 49% of the time even if the
parametric values were the same, so it would provide no reasonable basis for
rejecting the null hypothesis. The choice of a 95% significance level, however, is
arbitrary, and the difference between “significant” and “not significant” does not
reflect a sharp yes-or-no division in the real world. Meyerson & Meyerson, supra
note 151, at 824. Results that are not statistically significant may simply be
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Epidemiology goes further and maintains a particular ethos
that is “inherently conservative in its reluctance to abandon the
154
null hypothesis.”
This reluctance is substantially rooted in the
nature of epidemiology as an observational, rather than
155
experimental, science. Epidemiologists guard especially carefully
against incorrect causal attributions, seeking not only reproducible
epidemiologic results but other confirmatory evidence of the causal
156
nature of an observed association.
A scientific case for any
particular claim of toxic causation builds, if it builds at all, by
accretion.
To the extent, therefore, that courts refuse to permit a factfinder to assess expert testimony during the time the scientific case
is under construction, the law will avoid false positives at the
expense of allowing false negatives. But simply to say that “[l]aw
157
lags science; it does not lead it” is to beg the question. Even if
one accepts that toxic tort causation must be scientifically proven, it
takes an exercise of judicial discretion to determine what
constitutes admissible scientific proof and what constitutes
scientific proof sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material
fact. The false negative asymmetry manifests not so much in
courts’ judgment that science is required but in their judgment of
what science is required, which involves much more than the

reported as P > .05, which does not distinguish between a result that nearly
reaches the 95% significance level (e.g., P < .07) and a result that does not come
close (e.g., P < .49). A study of limited statistical power that produced a result
“significant” at the 93% level could indicate that a more powerful study is
warranted, and could—particularly if supported by other evidence—appropriately
be considered legally relevant. On the other hand, for some applications,
scientists consider the 95% significance level not nearly stringent enough. For
example, when biologists search the human genome for associations between
genetic variations and elevated risk of disease, they test so many genes that to set
the acceptable Type I error rate at 5% would produce vast numbers of purely
coincidental associations. They use a standard that is orders of magnitude stricter.
Karen N. Conneely & Michael Boehnke, Meta-Analysis of Genetic Association Studies
and Adjustment for Multiple Testing of Correlated SNPs and Traits, 34 GENETIC
EPIDEMIOLOGY 739, 739 (2010) (noting the “common approach” in genome-wide
association studies of using a cutoff of P < 5 * 10-8).
154. Finley, supra note 116, at 364.
155. See Green, supra note 64, at 336, 374–75 (distinguishing between
epidemiologic observation of associations and causal attribution).
156. Id. at 375–79 (describing Bradford Hill confirmatory factors).
157. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996); see also
Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1003 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (finding plaintiff must wait for proof to develop at “laggardly” pace of
science).
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transitive application of scientific norms of statistical significance.
Thus, where courts have held that causation testimony should
not be considered because the expert would have relied on the
results of toxicology studies in animal models or in vitro, or on
chemical structure analogies, or on epidemiologic studies of
people whose personal or exposure characteristics differed from
the plaintiff in some way, they rarely concluded that these studies
suffered from methodological flaws that invalidated their
conclusions as a matter of quality control within their respective
disciplines. Methodological reliability of the scientific evidence,
the keystone to Daubert, has faded in significance; fit has become
158
the “central question.”
A judge’s most critical decision,
frequently, is whether or not to reject out of hand a causal
inference that an expert is willing to make from the extant
159
scientific research.
The courts’ resistance to scientific inference of toxic tort
160
When courts
causation has been widespread and powerful.
refuse to admit testimony by well-credentialed experts based on
well-conducted studies, they do more than demand that litigation
achieve scientific truth. They define what scientific proof is for
161
juridical purposes.
In doing so, they make a legal, not a
scientific, judgment.
162
again provides an illustration. One of
Estate of George
plaintiff’s experts, attempting to assemble the disparate
epidemiologic results and the known information about the
deceased firefighter, would have testified that he reached his
conclusion of causation by applying the “weight of the evidence”
158. Sanders, supra note 20, at 1037–38. (“In the aftermath of Joiner and
Kumho Tire, federal-court admissibility decisions focus less on the Daubert factors
and more on a fit analysis. The central question in these opinions was whether
there is too large an analytical gap between the evidence available to the expert
and the conclusion the expert wishes to draw.”).
159. Id.
160. CRANOR, supra note 142, at 221–64 (giving numerous examples); Erica
Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563, 1647 (2000) (describing a toxic tort causation case as an
example of “the general judicial unwillingness to reason by analogy in assessing
scientific evidence”); see, e.g., Downs v. Perstorp Components, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1125–28 (E.D. Tenn. 1999) (giving examples of such inference that the
court considers fundamentally unscientific and improper).
161. See Sanders, supra note 20, at 1042–43 (describing basis for rejection of
studies relied on by plaintiff’s proffered experts in Joiner as Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s “implicit external-validity criteria”).
162. Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367 (Vt. 2010).
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163

approach.
The court rejected the expert’s invocation of this
approach because the expert could not state the “precise weight he
164
gave to each study.”
What is unclear is where the court got the
idea that such precision—presumably in quantitative terms—was
required for the testimony to be scientifically reliable and thus
165
admissible.
166
The courts have not been simply “prisoner[s] to science.”
Rather, many have heeded the Fifth Circuit’s admonition “in
subsequent toxic tort cases to be especially vigilant in scrutinizing
the basis, reasoning, and statistical significance of studies presented
167
“By both sides” is a fig leaf. Because plaintiffs
by both sides.”
bear the burden of proof, “especially vigilant” scrutiny will always
168
affect plaintiffs more than defendants. And “especially vigilant” is
a legal, not a scientific, standard.
The scientific nature of the causal inquiry and the courts’
adoption of concepts of scientific validity and statistical significance
have contributed importantly to the creation of a jurisprudence
that preferentially risks incorrect negative rather than positive legal
findings. But the false negative asymmetry is not a necessary result
of, and cannot entirely be explained by, acceptance of an axiom
that scientific truth be the standard for claims of toxic tort
causation.

163. Id. at 376.
164. Id. at 379.
165. Cf. King v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 762 N.W.2d 24, 39–40 (Neb.
2009) (“[N]o generally agreed-upon method exists for determining how much
weight to apply to particular types of studies.”).
166. Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 382 (quoting Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors &
Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
167. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 884 F.2d 166, 166 (5th Cir. 1989)
(amending Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989)).
168. Furthermore, to demand “statistical significance” for studies that fail to
find an association between exposure and disease makes no sense, because
statistical significance is used only to minimize the likelihood that scientists accept
false positive results. It might make sense, before accepting such a study as
providing evidence of no causation, to demand a showing that the study had
sufficient statistical power to find an effect if it existed.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

35

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6

1542

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

B. The Legitimacy Rationale: Courts in Need of Respect
Elemental notions of justice underlie the requirement of a
169
causal connection between defendant’s act and plaintiff’s harm.
We want fact-finders to believe that the defendant actually caused
the harm, which is why, despite the probabilistic language of the
preponderance standard, courts traditionally were uncomfortable
170
with using “naked” statistical evidence to establish causation.
Courts’ increasing willingness to accept epidemiologic data as
relevant to causal determinations in individual cases represented a
pragmatic shift from the dogma that “mere statistics” could never
be sufficient to hold a party liable for particularized harm. The
group-based nature of epidemiologic proof and the existence of
mass exposures, however, emphasized that the general causation
inquiry applied to the entire group. Some courts worried openly
171
about the prospect of inconsistent jury determinations,
and
judges have used their gatekeeping power to “resolve whole
172
categories of toxic torts” for failure to show general causation.
169. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to
Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1474
(1986) (noting that the actual causation requirement of proof that an “individual
defendant’s conduct, and not someone else’s,” caused harm is consistent with tort
law’s individual responsibility principle). A defendant’s interest in not being
unfairly held liable for harm the defendant did not cause is obvious. Even from a
plaintiff’s point of view, however, corrective justice ultimately is hollow if the party
held liable did not do the harm. Id. at 1476. From a deterrence perspective, both
false positive causal attributions and false negatives rejections of causation result in
deviations from optimum deterrence.
170. See, e.g., Howard v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 359–60 (7th Cir.
1998); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of
Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986) (highlighting that a determination of what
happened may seem speculative despite its statistical probability); Richard W.
Wright, Liability for Possible Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability, and the Burden of
Proof, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1295 (2008) (discussing the application of “naked”
statistics to the preponderance of the evidence standard). Lay people are similarly
hesitant. SANDERS, supra note 83, at 139–42 (summarizing research on willingness
to infer liability from statistical data alone); Edward F. Wright et al., Factors Affecting
the Use of Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability, 136 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 677, 685 (1996)
(finding that neither group discussion nor extended decision time overcame
mock jurors’ reluctance to use naked statistical evidence).
171. E.g., Brock, 874 F.2d at 310; see SANDERS, supra note 83, at 190 (noting that
concern for consistency “resonates” in Bendectin opinions). See generally Walker,
supra note 2, at 1108–09 (arguing that, if statistical evidence shows that causation is
true only in a certain percentage of cases, the objective of “equal treatment of
similar evidence” necessarily implies that adjudicative errors will not be equally
distributed).
172. Sanders, supra note 20, at 1040. In theory, courts might apply claim
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Several such categories of cases, including the Bendectin cases,
have been described as “situations where subsequent scientific
study has refuted prior legal determinations of general
173
causation.” These situations have encouraged calls for limiting or
eliminating the tort system’s role in determining toxic tort
causation questions, which reflect a loss in “confidence in the legal
system . . . when hindsight shows that liability was imposed on an
entity that did not ‘cause’ another’s harm using any meaning of the
174
word.” Might the desire to avoid this loss of legitimacy justify the
false negative asymmetry?
To the extent that the loss of legitimacy results simply because
175
erroneous adjudication sometimes occurs, preferring one type of
error over another does not seem justified. There is no reason to
expect confidence in the legal system to deteriorate any less if
compensation is denied and hindsight shows that toxic exposure
probably caused the illness after all. The law promises redress for
wrongful injury. A demonstrable failure to keep that promise has
the flavor of betrayal, particularly if judges are perceived to have
deprived deserving plaintiffs not just of financial recoveries, but of
176
their day in court.
Here, too, it is no answer to say that the asymmetry is
appropriate because the law must take the science as it finds it. In
applying that principle, the courts decide how much or how little
scientific evidence constitutes no legal evidence. The application
may produce the false negative asymmetry, but does not provide a
legitimacy-based justification for it.
preclusion to hold that general causation is established as a matter of law. In a few
circumstances, courts have to some extent limited dispute of general causation.
E.g., Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig. v. E.I. DuPont, 292 F.3d 1124, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2002) (noting scientific and legal authority recognizing that radiation can
cause cancer at lowest doses); see Boston, supra note 50, at 293 (observing that by
the mid-1970s, courts held as matter of law that asbestos causes mesothelioma).
But the court’s resolution of general causation is less useful to a plaintiff than to a
defendant because each plaintiff must prove the extent of exposure and specific
causation as well. See Hanford, 292 F.3d at 1134.
173. Klein, supra note 2, at 30 n.149.
174. Id. at 30. Professor Klein’s article does not endorse the asymmetrical
preference for false negatives or proposals to eliminate the role of tort law, but
argues for strong adherence to sine qua non causation in toxic tort cases. Id.
175. See Walker, supra note 2, at 1081 n.13 (“[G]rounding the legitimacy of
judicial action” is one justification for law’s “goal of discovering truth.”).
176. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 137 (1974) (noting that
“have-nots” often litigate for symbolic reasons).
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It is true, however, that the two types of errors are not equally
visible. Incorrect imposition of liability is easily observed if later
scientific inquiry refutes the accuracy of earlier judgments. It
becomes even more obvious if a product’s sellers take action
apparently in response to the liability, such as removing a drug
177
from market.
By contrast, harm actually caused by toxic
exposures, erroneously left unremedied, may easily be missed. The
verdicts and judicial opinions in the defense’s favor themselves
become known, at least to the bar and perhaps to the public, but
the consequential effects of false negative causation holdings are
harder to detect. Potential plaintiffs may not pursue claims,
potential plaintiffs’ counsel may not accept cases, and even further
scientific inquiry into the alleged causal relation may be
178
inhibited.
Relatively invisible errors are unlikely to affect the perceived
legitimacy of the judicial process as much as readily visible errors.
On the other hand, false negative errors in toxic causation cases
can tend to reinforce perceptions of the legal system as favoring
the interests of large corporations at the expense of individual
human beings, undermining the system’s claim of equal justice
179
under law.
The law’s truth-seeking function vitally supports the legitimacy
of the rule of law. Minimizing error is a noble goal. But the
legitimacy rationale seems an insufficient justification for
asymmetrical error avoidance.

177. See GREEN, supra note 83, at 180–87 (describing withdrawal of Bendectin
from the market and known or hypothesized considerations relevant to withdrawal
decision).
178. See CRANOR, supra note 142, at 6–7 (noting inhibitory effect of judicial
screening of expert testimony on “plaintiffs’ realistic access to the law”); GREEN,
supra note 83, at 332 (noting that litigation made Bendectin a “hot topic” among
researchers, promoting scientific investigation); Stephen Breyer, REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, Introduction, at 1, 3 (Fed. Judicial Center ed., 2d
ed. 2000) (acknowledging that incorrect denials of compensation “discourage
other similarly situated individuals from even trying to obtain compensation”).
179. McGarity, supra note 14, at 26 (arguing that one could view the
imposition of a relative risk threshold greater than two “as a policy of shielding
manufacturers of dangerous products from accountability through tort law.”).
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C. The Welfare Rationale: Courts as Policy Makers
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Joiner provided a
glimpse of another concern that could underlie the false negative
asymmetry. Justice Breyer acknowledged that “scientific evidence
implicates some chemicals as potential causes of some cancers,”
180
He
which was the essence of the allegation at issue in Joiner.
worried, however, that “modern life, including good health as well
as economic well-being, depends upon the use of artificial or
181
manufactured substances . . . .”
Therefore, he reasoned,
stringent judicial evidentiary gatekeeping was needed to “help
assure that the powerful engine of tort liability, which can generate
strong financial incentives to reduce, or to eliminate, production,
points towards the right substances and does not destroy the wrong
182
ones.”
On its face, Justice Breyer’s exhortation to trial judges seems
neutral, pleading for accuracy in both positive and negative
assessments of causal attribution. The real emphasis, however,
could not be plainer:
In Justice Breyer’s view, a legal decision that a product is
harmful when science is not yet certain presents greater
policy problems than the alternative of allowing
continued marketing and barring the courthouse door to
ill people whose claims of causation may in fact later be
183
widely embraced by the scientific community.

180. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997). Mr. Joiner alleged that
exposure to PCBs, furans and dioxins hastened his development of lung cancer.
Id. at 139.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 148–49; see also Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley, 521 U.S.
424, 434–35 (1997) (holding in Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was that a
railroad worker exposed to asbestos could not use contact with asbestos as basis of
claim for emotional distress damages, in part because of frequency with which
Americans are exposed to carcinogens, and expressing concerns about higher
prices that would result if such claims were allowed).
183. Finley, supra note 116, at 345. Other scholars have read Justice Breyer’s
concurrence similarly. E.g., David E. Bernstein, Asbestos Litigation & Tort Law:
Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 11, 24–26 (2003);
Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double
Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 761 (1998); Stephan Landsman, The Jury’s Role in
Administering Justice in the United States: Of Mushrooms and Nullifiers: Rules of Evidence
and the American Jury, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 65, 69 (2002); McGarity, supra
note 13, at 41; Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The Constitutional
Boundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 874–75 (2008).
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Justice Breyer stressed that in cases “where testimony about
general risk levels in human beings or animals is offered to prove
184
individual causation” —the paradigmatic toxic tort situation—it
185
was particularly “essential” for trial courts to exercise their power
to control the introduction of expert evidence, even if doing so
might require “subtle and sophisticated determinations about
186
scientific methodology.”
This is very nearly an explicit
187
endorsement of the false negative asymmetry; it has been applied
to that effect.
188
In Tamraz v. Lincoln Electric Co., a divided panel of the Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded a plaintiff’s judgment entered on a
jury verdict. The appellate court held that the trial judge had
abused her discretion in admitting the testimony of one of
plaintiff’s experts who opined that manganese in welding fumes
189
caused the plaintiff’s illness.
The majority acknowledged that if
plaintiff “does not [prevail on retrial], yet it turns out ten years
from now that manganese causes his disease, that result will seem
unfair. But the alternative route—allowing the law to get ahead of
190
science—would be just as unfair.”
Why? Citing Justice Breyer’s
Joiner concurrence, the court explained: because it “would destroy
191
jobs and stifle innovation unnecessarily.”

184. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 149.
186. Id. at 147.
187. See Gass v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 558 F.3d 419, 437 (6th Cir. 2009)
(Boggs, J., dissenting) (construing Justice Breyer’s concern about the “powerful
engine of tort liability” as a warning that “it is too easy to charge an uncommon
harm to the presence of a mysterious substance”).
188. 620 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2010).
189. Id. at 667.
190. Id. at 677–78.
191. Id. at 678. It is interesting that the court equated reduced social welfare—
less innovation and lost jobs for unidentified individuals—with “unfairness” similar
to the injustice of denying a valid claim for physical harm done to a particular
plaintiff. The majority also invoked the slaves-of-science rationale, describing “the
alternative route” as “allowing the law to get ahead of science.” Id. at 677–78. The
dissent argued that there was plenty of science for the law to chew on; the causal
link in question “was certainly the subject of valid scientific debate and
publication” but the majority demanded excessive scientific “finality.” Id. at 683–
84 (Martin, J., dissenting). The case was a bellwether trial in multi-district
litigation involving hundreds of cases. Id. at 667; see In re Welding Fume Prods.
Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 2d 775, 777 (N.D. Ohio 2007). This procedural posture
may have influenced the stringency of the appellate court’s view of the causation
evidence. See Boston, supra note 50, at 363–83 (arguing that courts should be
more stringent in mass exposure cases).
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Justice Breyer returned to this theme in his extra-judicial
writings as well. A significant portion of his introduction to the
influential Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence dwells on toxic
192
tort causation.
Although here, too, Justice Breyer acknowledges
that false negative decisions have adverse consequences, the façade
of neutrality again is easily pierced:
A decision wrongly denying compensation in a toxic
substance case, for example, can not only deprive the
plaintiff of warranted compensation but also discourage
other similarly situated individuals from even trying to
obtain compensation and encourage the continued use of
a dangerous substance. On the other hand, a decision
wrongly granting compensation, although of immediate
benefit to the plaintiff, can improperly force
abandonment of the substance. Thus, if the decision is
wrong, it will improperly deprive the public of what can
be far more important benefits—those surrounding a
drug that cures many while subjecting a few to less serious
193
risk, for example.
Who would want to “force abandonment” (as opposed to
merely internalizing externally-imposed costs) of a drug that “cures
many” (presumably of a fatal or deadly disease) to compensate “a
few” (the unlucky who must pay the price of progress) for a “risk”
(that presumably may not come to pass, though the existence of an
actual plaintiff would suggest otherwise) that is “less serious”
(perhaps little more than a nuisance)? Justice Breyer’s conclusion
fairly leaps from his imagery. Whether it fairly fits his data is
another question.
The influence of the self-consciously political—and
controversial—crusade against so-called “junk science” is manifest
194
in Justice Breyer’s work.
But, as we are often reminded, courts
195
decide particular concrete cases.
192. Breyer, supra note 178, at 3–7.
193. Id. at 3–4. For Justice Breyer’s views on the risks of environmental
exposures and government regulation thereof, see generally STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993).
194. See Breyer, supra note 178, at 4 (citing PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 54 (1991)). For a critique, see Kenneth
J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637
(1993).
195. E.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir.
1989), modified on reh’g, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[G]eneral and abstract
formulations” of the standards for directed verdicts or judgments notwithstanding
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So despite all the case law and commentary published since
Daubert and Joiner, it is helpful to go back to these beginnings and
consider the particular toxic tort cases the Supreme Court saw and
the role these cases played in promoting the false negative
asymmetry that is subliminal in Daubert, evident in the majority
opinion in Joiner, and overt in Justice Breyer’s Joiner concurrence.
Daubert was a Bendectin case. By the time it reached the
Supreme Court, courts had begun their concerted effort to force
an end to Bendectin litigation, primarily because extensive
epidemiologic research had failed to associate pregnant women’s
Bendectin consumption with a statistically significant increased risk
196
of any particular birth defect.
This backdrop likely explains the
Supreme Court’s decision to include, alongside its holding that the
science supporting an expert opinion need not be “generally
accepted” to be admissible, lengthy dicta setting out the nowfamiliar non-exclusive list of “factors [that] will bear on the
197
Lower courts received and understood this multiplex
inquiry.”
signal. As one district judge put it just a few weeks after the
Supreme Court handed down Daubert, the decision “kill[ed] Frye
198
and then resurrect[ed] its ghost.”
In Daubert itself, the Ninth Circuit on remand evaluated the
proffered testimony of each of the plaintiffs’ experts and
determined that it had to be excluded as a matter of law—that for a
199
trial judge to admit it would be an abuse of discretion.
The
court’s analysis of the testimony’s reliability emphasized that the
plaintiffs’ experts’ efforts did not spring from pre-existing
the verdict “lose much of their usefulness . . . when we attempt to apply them to
the concrete factual situation at hand.”).
196. SANDERS, supra note 83, at 190 (noting that the judiciary became
convinced that any plaintiff verdict was wrong). Much of this research developed
in response to the litigation. GREEN, supra note 83, at 332.
197. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
198. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1033 (S.D.N.Y.
1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Maiorana v. U.S. Mineral Prod. Co., 52
F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923)).
199. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315, 1321–22 (9th
Cir. 1995). Because the Dauberts had appealed from a summary judgment, the
Ninth Circuit would “affirm the summary judgment only if, as a matter of law, the
proffered evidence would have to be excluded at trial.” Id. at 1315. To help
district judges understand how they should tilt in future similar cases, the court of
appeals emphasized that even if the evidence were “not per se inadmissible, the
district court on remand would nevertheless have discretion to reject it.” Id.
(emphasis added).
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campaigns of original research independent of litigation and had
not been published in peer-reviewed journals. Failing that, the
Ninth Circuit held that the experts needed to, but did not, “point
to some objective source . . . to show that they have followed the
scientific method, as it is practiced by (at least) a recognized
200
minority of scientists in their field.”
Despite this strong implication that the plaintiffs’ experts
would fail the Supreme Court’s reliability test, the panel that
decided Daubert on remand excluded only one of plaintiffs’ experts
201
for that reason.
The others, the court acknowledged, might be
able to provide the needed “objective, independent” evidence of
reliability if given the chance to do so on remand to the district
202
court.
For example, a witness who testified about teratogenicity
testing in animals might be able to explain why extrapolation from
203
the animal studies to humans is valid.
The Ninth Circuit did not
give them the chance.
Instead, the court prohibited them from testifying for lack of
204
“fit,” the second requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court.
Why did their testimony not “fit?” Because none of them would
testify that epidemiologic evidence showed Bendectin more than
205
doubled the risk of plaintiff’s birth defect.
In effect, the Ninth
Circuit held that even assuming the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony
could establish general causation, without proof of relative risk
greater than two, the plaintiffs could not establish specific
206
causation.
And that, the Ninth Circuit held, made all of the
207
testimony not just insufficient but inadmissible —an early
example of the commingling of these two theoretically separate
standards.
200. Id. at 1319. The court described “(at least) a recognized minority” as a
relaxation of the general acceptance test. Id. at 1319, n.11. But the court’s
indicia of reliability track closely with general acceptance.
201. That expert opined that Bendectin caused the plaintiff’s particular birth
defect. Id. at 1319. The Ninth Circuit held that such an opinion could not be
scientifically reliable. Id. at 1319.
202. Id. at 1320.
203. Id. The Ninth Circuit had to consider this possibility because the parties
and the district court had proceeded under the newly-invalidated Frye test;
plaintiffs argued that the appellate court should remand for development of a
record applying the new test. Id. at 1314–15.
204. Id. at 1320.
205. Id. at 1320–21.
206. Id. at 1322 (“[W]hat plaintiffs must prove is not that Bendectin causes
some birth defects, but that it caused their birth defects.”).
207. Id.
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There can be little doubt that the Bendectin cases powerfully
influenced judicial perceptions of claims alleging that serious but
difficult-to-trace illnesses were caused by exposure to toxic
208
209
substances.
Courts rejecting Bendectin claims increasingly
announced the rigid and strict rules that together produce the false
negative asymmetry, culminating in the Texas Supreme Court’s
210
Havner opinion handed down just a few months before the
United States Supreme Court decided Joiner. Although these cases
were decided in the factual context of Bendectin claims, by and
large the appellate courts made no effort to restrict the legal rules
211
they announced to that context.
Thus, by the time the Supreme Court decided Joiner, the
Bendectin cases and the plaintiffs’ experts in those cases had taken
on a symbolic, representative significance. Joiner, of course, was not
about Bendectin. The plaintiff, Robert Joiner, alleged that
212
exposure to PCBs had promoted his lung cancer.
Unlike the
Bendectin plaintiffs, Joiner did not confront a wall of large
epidemiologic studies that failed to show an increase in risk
associated with exposure. Instead, his experts tried to rely on
epidemiologic studies, together with animal studies, to establish
208. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. c (2010) (noting that the Agent Orange and Bendectin cases “led
some courts to distrust juries’ ability to resolve cases based on conflicting expertopinion evidence”); GREEN, supra note 83, at 307–10.
209. The history of reported Bendectin decisions is sketched in Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 709–11 (Tex. 1997), and detailed in
SANDERS, supra note 83, at 146–49, 157–58.
210. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
211. E.g., id. at 717 (“[W]e are persuaded that properly designed and executed
epidemiological studies may be part of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic
tort case and that there is a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be
more than a ‘doubling of the risk’ to our no evidence standard of review and to
the more likely than not burden of proof.” (emphasis added)); see also supra note
61 and accompanying text. Although some courts later tried to limit the
generality of some of the holdings in Bendectin cases, they rarely suggested that
the holdings applied only to Bendectin claims. E.g., Taylor v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., No. 5:01-CV-166-C, 2004 LEXIS 30805, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2004)
(treating Havner as limited to sufficiency, rather than admissibility, of evidence).
When a panel of the Fifth Circuit tried to do so, the en banc court rejected the
attempt. Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1990),
superseded, 939 F.2d 1106 (1991) (en banc); see also Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp.,
362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 822 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“Havner . . . spoke generally about the
use of epidemiological evidence . . . and the Court does not read the opinion to
limit those principles solely to the Bendectin context.”).
212. Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (N.D. Ga. 1994),
rev’d, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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213

causation.
Writing for a majority that included Justice Breyer, Chief
Justice Rehnquist examined, one by one, scientific studies on which
Joiner’s experts relied and opined that some defect made the study
inadequate to support the inference of causation to which the
214
expert was prepared to testify.
Therefore, the Court held, the
district judge had not abused her discretion in applying Daubert to
215
This approach elicited dissent
preclude the experts’ testimony.
216
from Justice Stevens, but the majority was unmoved. The opinion
of the Court stated, “[a] court may conclude that there is simply
too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
217
proffered.”
As support for that proposition, the Court cited the
one and only toxic tort case (besides Daubert) that it deigned to
mention: Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, another Bendectin
218
case.
219
suggests that the
Joiner’s direct borrowing from Turpin
history and notoriety of the Bendectin litigation influenced Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s migration from his cautious position in Daubert
220
to the aggressive, arguably unnecessary attack on Joiner’s experts’
reasoning. Turpin also prefigured Justice Breyer’s concerns about
the harm of wrongful conclusions of causation.
The Turpin court, affirming the exclusion of expert testimony
based on animal studies, took pains to explain that even if (as
plaintiffs’ experts said) such studies showed Bendectin had the
“capacity” to cause developmental defects, they did not support an
inference that Bendectin caused such defects in humans. Quoting
a “recognized text on teratology,” the court noted that “‘virtually all
213. The epidemiologic evidence was not as strong as plaintiff might have
liked; one of plaintiff’s experts described a study conducted in Japan as “suggestive
but not convincing.” Id. at 1326.
214. Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 522 U.S. 136, 146–47 (1997).
215. Id. at 143.
216. Id. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Commentators later criticized
the majority approach as well. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
217. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
218. Id. (citing Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th
Cir. 1992)).
219. Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1360–61 (“The analytical gap between the [animal
study] evidence presented and the inferences to be drawn on the ultimate issue of
human birth defects is too wide. Under such circumstances, a jury should not be
asked to speculate on the issue of causation.”).
220. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 151 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (arguing for
remand to court of appeals for application of correct standard of review of district
court’s admissibility decision).
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drugs and a great range of chemicals’” could harm embryos
221
This might have
“‘under appropriate laboratory conditions.’”
been sufficient to support the argument that the inference was
unjustified, because it is presumably not the case that “virtually all
drugs and a great range of chemicals” are human teratogens at
222
ordinary exposure doses.
The court, however, did not stop there.
“The author
concludes,” the court continued, “that to ‘eliminate drugs and
chemicals because they can be shown to be embryotoxic at high
dosage would be unacceptable’ because to do so ‘would eliminate
most drugs and many useful chemicals upon which modern society
223
depends heavily.’” Thus plaintiffs’ experts’ causal inference must
also be rejected because the social cost of accepting it is simply too
high. To allow such testimony would turn the “powerful engine”
224
on too many valuable products.
This explicit social calculus concurs implicitly in the generally
accepted Bendectin narrative. Bendectin’s manufacturer withdrew
the drug from the United States market in 1983, relatively early in
the life history of both litigation about the drug and of
225
epidemiologic research into whether Bendectin was teratogenic.
Given the consensus that Bendectin did not cause the birth defects
of which it was suspected, and the lack of any approved available
substitute for it in treating pregnancy-related nausea, many
commentators have lamented the social costs imposed by
226
Bendectin’s unavailability.
Nevertheless, and irrespective of

221. Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1359 (quoting James Wilson, Current Status of
Teratology, in HANDBOOK OF TERATOLOGY 60 (J. Wilson & C. Fraser eds., 1977)).
222. Then again, one never knows, because no one knows the cause of the vast
majority of birth defects. See Lynch v. Merrell-Nat’l Labs., Div. of RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 830 F.2d 1190, 1193 (1st Cir. 1987). Perhaps, instead of being the
cruel caprice of a stochastic universe, many of those idiopathic birth defects result
from very small, effectively unmeasurable, teratogenic effects of one or another
ubiquitous component of the human environment.
223. Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1359 (quoting James Wilson, supra note 221).
224. Even before Turpin, the Fifth Circuit had expressed the same concern in
another Bendectin case. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 310
(5th Cir. 1989), modified on reh’g, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Appellate courts, if
they take the lead in resolving those questions upon which juries will go both ways,
can reduce some of the uncertainty which can tend to produce a sub-optimal
amount of new drug development.”).
225. GREEN, supra note 83, at 180–87.
226. E.g., James M. Sabovich, Petition Without Prejudice: Against the Fraud
Exception to Noerr-Pennington Immunity from the Toxic Tort Perspective, 17 PENN. ST.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2008).
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whether the Bendectin narrative is subject to challenge,
228
Bendectin-as-prototype is an assumption, not an established fact.
To Bendectin’s thesis, DES is the antithesis. DES, far from
being a vital and irreplaceable medicine, was pretty much useless
229
for its intended purpose.
It caused (unlike Justice Breyer’s
hypothetical drug hounded from the market) not merely a risk of
230
an annoyance, but at least hundreds of cases of cancer.
It bears repeating that in the early 1980s there was reason to
worry about Bendectin. The animal studies and chemical structure
information that some experts used to draw inferences about
231
Bendectin’s likely teratogenicity were not invented or fanciful.
Subsequent human epidemiologic studies repeatedly failed to
confirm those inferences. It does not follow that such inference is
inherently improper. Nor does it follow that the strength of such
inferences is the same for suspected carcinogens as for suspected
teratogens, or for one type of cancer as another, or for one
substance as another.
Of course some substances suspected of causing disease are
later shown not to do so, but other substances cause disease while
the evidence of their toxicity accrues. The evidence that cigarette
232
smoking causes lung cancer accumulated slowly for decades,
while tobacco companies argued that animal studies and other
227. See GREEN, supra note 83, at 336–37 (noting that Bendectin may have been
less effective than claimed, that doctors may have prescribed Bendectin
inappropriately, and that substitute medications were available after Bendectin’s
manufacturer withdrew the drug from the market).
228. Some courts substitute the breast implant litigation as the prototype. See
Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 678 (6th Cir. 2010).
229. Sarina Schrager & Beth E. Potter, Diethylstilbestrol Exposure, 69 AM. FAMILY
PHYSICIAN 2395, 2395 (2004) (noting data published in 1953 showed DES was
ineffective for preventing pregnancy complications, but that it was prescribed for
this purpose at least until 1971, when published data revealed the association of
DES with vaginal clear cell adenocarcinoma).
230. CNTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DES Update, http://www.cdc.gov
/des/consumers/download/cdc_des_update.pdf (stating risk of developing
vaginal clear adenocarcinoma before menopause is “virtually non-existent” absent
in utero exposure to DES, which increases risk 40 times) (last visited Apr. 9, 2011);
Ralph I. Horwitz et al., Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina and Cervix: Incidence,
Undetected Disease, and Diethylstilbestrol, 41 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 593, 593, 597
(1987) (noting more than 500 cases of clear cell adenocarcinoma then known to
exist, but that previously reported incidence rates “greatly underestimate the true
occurrence of the cancer”).
231. SANDERS, supra note 83, at 63 (“At the end of 1984 one would have
concluded that the in vivo research cast doubt on the safety of Bendectin.”).
232. ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY 123–57, 211–17 (2007)
(describing research from the 1920s to 1960s).
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experiments failed to provide scientific proof of the link between
233
Similarly, the link between
cigarette smoking and lung cancer.
asbestos and several diseases, now so widely accepted, took time to
234
prove and was disputed for years.
235
The toxicity of lead has been known for centuries, but proof
of lead’s effects at low levels and the link between specific products
and exposure routes developed only slowly. For example, into the
1970s, the lead industry insisted that airborne lead had not been

233. See, e.g., Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir. 1968)
(describing how, on retrial limited to issue of whether defendant’s cigarettes were
fit and wholesome for human use, defendant introduced testimony that cause of
cancer was unknown), overruled on reh’g en banc, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969);
Green v. Am. Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir. 1962) (describing battle of
experts at trial on question of whether cigarette smoke caused plaintiff’s lung
cancer); see also, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 8–9 (8th Cir. 1964)
(describing defendant’s argument that plaintiff had not submitted sufficient
evidence of causation to reach the jury); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
317 F.2d 19, 22–3 (5th Cir. 1963) (describing defendant’s argument at trial for
lack of causal connection between smoking and plaintiff’s cancer and that
plaintiff’s other medical conditions, such as rheumatism, caused cancer);
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 1961)
(describing defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s experts’ causation opinions
“should have no validity” because of lack of proof of their general acceptance).
Even in the 1980s, expert witnesses and tobacco executives testified that despite
statistical association showing cigarette smoking is a risk factor for lung cancer, it
had never been proven to be a cause of lung cancer. See BRANDT, supra note 232, at
341, 343 (quoting testimony). See generally Daniel Givelber, Cigarette Law, 73 IND.
L.J. 867, 894–95 (1998) (stating that for individual plaintiff smokers, causation
claims would still be vulnerable to attack because of group-based nature of the
evidence); Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REV. 853, 858 (1992) (from outset of litigation against cigarette
companies, “industry hotly contested the causal linkage between smoking and
lung cancer.”); id. at 860 (industry has never conceded causation even though in
earliest cases juries generally found causation).
234. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 112–27 (Pantheon Books
1985) (describing efforts of asbestos industry to suppress or impugn evidence of
health effects accumulating during 1920s through 1940s); W.C. Hueper,
Occupational and Nonoccupational Exposures to Asbestos, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.
184, 184 (1965) (stating that despite three decades of increasing amount of
epidemiologic, clinical, and pathologic evidence linking asbestos to lung cancer
and mesothelioma, “some commercially interested parties and their medical
guardians and protectors still prefer . . . to deny the existence of these dangerous
and usually fatal sequelae of a respiratory contact with asbestos dust.”); id. at 192
(noting “highly controversial negative results” of an “industry-dominated”
Canadian epidemiologic study).
235. AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (ATSDR), U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR LEAD 21 (2007), available
at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp13.pdf.
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236

shown to be a human health hazard.
When the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) proposed phasing down the amount of
lead in gasoline, it could not be certain that reducing this airborne
exposure source would reduce the concentration of lead in
237
children’s blood.
Thoroughly convincing proof came only after
the regulation went into effect over a stiff industry challenge,
essentially allowing the EPA to conduct a nationwide epidemiologic
238
experiment.
Newer findings have pushed the supposedly “safe,”
or at least officially acceptable, blood level of lead steadily
239
downward.
Many of the above examples have in common industry’s
persistent efforts to question, minimize, deny, and at worst conceal
the health effects of a product. But sometimes, even without profit
motive, studies that seem to absolve alleged causes have been
proven wrong. For example, after concern emerged about lead in
drinking water in some homes in Washington, D.C., the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) rushed to publish a
reassuring report, which understated the effect of high lead
concentrations in drinking water on the blood lead levels of
children, based on preliminary data that had not undergone
240
rigorous review. The CDC did not acknowledge the error for six
236. CHRISTIAN WARREN, BRUSH WITH DEATH 220 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2000) (quoting 1970 legislative testimony by Lead Industries Association trade
executive director, John Kimberly).
237. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The problems
faced by EPA in deciding whether lead automotive emissions pose a threat to the
public health highlight the limitations of awaiting certainty” before regulating); id.
at 47 (“The evidence did not always point in one direction. . . .”); id. at 73
(“Implicit in the administrative record . . . is the recognition by EPA that available
scientific data did not provide a clear and certain basis for reaching the statutorily
mandated conclusion . . . .”) (Wilkey, J., dissenting); see id. at 38–46 (outlining
information in the administrative record as well as the information’s limitations).
238. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 529
(D.C. Cir. 1983); see Jamie Lincoln Kitman, 8,500 Years of Lead, 79 Years of Leaded
Gasoline, THE NATION (Mar. 20, 2000), http://www.mindfully.org/Pesticide/LeadHistory.htm.
239. In the 1970s, blood lead levels above thirty micrograms per deciliter were
considered “excessive.” Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force, 705 F.2d at 527.
Today, federal authorities consider children to have elevated blood lead if the
concentration is above ten micrograms per deciliter, but acknowledge that lower
levels have been associated with neurobehavioral effects and there appears to be
no threshold below which lead is not neurotoxic. See ATSDR, supra note 235, at
16, 23; see also CRANOR, supra note 142, at 278 (describing similar development of
evidence of the toxicity of low-level benzene and arsenic).
240. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATION & OVERSIGHT OF THE
COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A PUBLIC HEALTH
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years, during which time, to all appearances, the “best” scientific
evidence indicated that the lead in the water was no cause for
241
concern.
Even in the case of drugs, which—unlike most substances—
undergo advance testing for safety, evidence that accumulates after
marketing regularly reveals harmful effects not previously
242
detected. The slowly building case that led to recent restrictions
243
on the use of the diabetes drug rosiglitazone is a case in point. In
August 2007, based on adverse event reporting, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) required a boxed warning about cardiac
244
risks of the drug. Just three months later, the FDA strengthened
TRAGEDY: HOW FLAWED CDC DATA AND FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS ENDANGERED
CHILDREN’S HEALTH IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 33–35 (2010), available at
http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/hearings/2010/Ove
rsight/20may/Staff%20Report_DC%20Lead_5.20.10.pdf.
241. Robert McCartney, A Champion of the Truth About Lead-Tainted Tap Water,
WASH. POST, May 23, 2010, at C1, C3 (noting that CDC issued its report in 2004
and issued corrective notice in 2010, after publication in 2009 of independent
research demonstrating that original report understated risks). The examples of
lead in air and water relate to proof that an environmental exposure produced
higher body burdens rather than proof that a received dose caused disease, but
the situations are analogous. In any claim for damages resulting from exposure to
airborne or water-borne lead, the connection between the environmental level
and the body burden would be a link in the causal chain. See CRANOR, supra note
142, at 35 (describing the causation element required for toxic tort suits).
242. The complexity of drugs’ biological activity and the difference between
populations in controlled clinical trials and the range of patients who may take a
drug after approval make it “impossible to know everything about a drug at the
point of approval . . . . Thus, the understanding of a drug’s risk-benefit profile
necessarily evolves over the drug’s lifecycle.” COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYS, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACAD., THE FUTURE OF DRUG
SAFETY: PROMOTING & PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 2 (Alina Baciu et al.
eds., 2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11750.
For a description of the drug approval process and post-marketing monitoring, see
id. at 31–51 (approval), 51–9 (post-approval). For recent amendments to those
processes, see Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L.
No. 110–85 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301). See also GREEN, supra note
83, at 52–3 (noting that when General Accounting Office studied 198 approved
drugs, more than half had serious risks not detected prior to approval); Thomas
O. McGarity, Corporate Accountability for Scientific Fraud: Ketek and the Perils of
Aggressive Agency Preemption, 58 EMORY L.J. 287, 293 (2008) (noting that preapproval testing is “statistically incapable of detecting side effects that occur
relatively rarely, have long latency periods,” or occur in vulnerable sub-populations
not studied).
243. Rosiglitazone is better known by one of its trade names, Avandia. See Index
to Drug-Specific Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs
/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM111
085#Z (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
244. Manufacturers of Some Diabetes Drugs to Strengthen Warning on Heart Failure
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the warning based on a meta-analysis of existing epidemiologic
245
In August 2009, the FDA received data from a long-term
data.
246
clinical study of the drug, and in September 2010, FDA relied on
247
that data to “significantly restrict[]” the use of rosiglitazone.
Other well-known examples include the cardiac and breast cancer
risks associated with hormone therapy for menopausal women,
248
which had been prescribed for decades, and the cardiac risk of
249
widely prescribed non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs.
Risk, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents
/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108966.htm.
245. Janet Woodcock, FDA Press Conference on the Update to the Existing Box
Warning on Avandia (Nov. 14, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.fda.gov
/downloads/NewsEvents/Newsroom/MediaTranscripts/UCM122282.pdf).
246. FDA Drug Safety Communication: Ongoing Review of Avandia (Rosiglitazone) and
Cardiovascular Safety, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.fda.gov
/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders
/ucm201418.htm.
247. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., HHS FDA: BRIEFING ON AVANDIA (Sept. 23,
2010)
(statement
of
FDA
Commissioner
Margaret
Hamburg),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPati
entsandProviders/ucm227934.htm. The New York Times reported that the drug’s
manufacturer had not disclosed the results of a 1999 study suggesting that the
drug carried more cardiac risk than a competing medication. Gardiner Harris,
Diabetes Drug Maker Hid Test Data, Files Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A1.
248. Elizabeth Barrett-Connor, Book Review, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1670, 1670
(2007) (reviewing ELIZABETH SIEGEL WATKINS, THE ESTROGEN ELIXIR: A HISTORY OF
HORMONE REPLACEMENT THERAPY IN AMERICA (2007) (describing history of
prescription of hormone treatment)); Wulf H. Utian, Book Review, 118 J. CLIN.
INVEST. 392 (2008) (reviewing ELIZABETH SIEGEL WATKINS, THE ESTROGEN ELIXIR: A
HISTORY OF HORMONE REPLACEMENT THERAPY IN AMERICA (2007)), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2214716/
(describing
2002
Women’s Health Initiative findings as “reversal of general medical opinion”). See
generally Peter M. Ravdin et al., The Decrease in Breast-Cancer Incidence in 2003 in the
United States, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1670 (2007) (linking reduced rates of breast
cancer to women’s decreased use of hormone therapy after publicity surrounding
2002 findings); Press Release, National Institutes of Health, WHI Study Data
Confirm Short-Term Heart Disease Risks of Combination Hormone Therapy for
Postmenopausal Women (Feb. 15, 2010), available at http://www.nih.gov/news
/health/feb2010/nhlbi-15.htm (describing study of hormone therapy and recent
findings).
249. McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc., 949 A.2d 223, 229–48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008) (describing results and manufacturer’s depiction of post-approval
studies showing increased risk of cardiovascular events in patients taking Vioxx as
compared to other drugs); Rita Rubin, How Did Vioxx Debacle Happen?, USA TODAY,
Nov. 12, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2004-10-12-vioxx-cover
_x.htm (quoting an FDA official’s acknowledgment that evidence of effects
accumulated for several years before withdrawal of drug). See generally Press
Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., COX-2 Selective (Includes Bextra, Celebrex, and
Vioxx) and Non-Selective Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs (NSAIDs) (April
7,
2005),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements
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The point is simply that detecting these causal relations is
difficult, almost always post hoc, and frequently generates
250
conflicting information.
It is incorrect to assume that the socialwelfare arrow points to an assumption of “no causation” in every
case in which the causal connection has scientific support but is still
251
uncertain.
Yet that is the assumption upon which rests the
252
welfare justification of the false negative asymmetry. Good health
and economic well-being depend, as Justice Breyer said, on all
253
kinds of substances, some of which may be incorrectly suspected
of causing disease; but good health and economic well-being may
also warrant less (or no) production of substances that cause
disease while serving purposes that are of limited benefit or that
could easily, cheaply, and safely be achieved by other means.
Even taking a strictly utilitarian view of tort law, enforcing the
false negative asymmetry on the causation element is a theoretically
incoherent way to achieve efficient case outcomes. A product may
cause disease even if it is, on balance, socially useful; its benefits
may be weighed against its risks in determining whether marketing
the product was negligent, whether the product was unreasonably
dangerous, or whether a warning about the product was
254
inadequate. Absent one of these bases for liability, a false positive
causation finding cannot result in over-deterrence. If negligence

/2005/ucm108427.htm.
250. See COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE US DRUG SAFETY SYSTEM, supra note
242, at 57 (“Rare is the story that builds as clearly and completely as one would like
for making scientific evaluations and regulatory decisions.”). Even as the FDA
restricted use of rosiglitazone, the scientist who made the decision described the
supporting evidence as “not robust or consistent.” Memorandum from Janet
Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to NDA 021071, Decision
on Continued Marketing of Rosiglitazone (Avandia, Avandamet, Avandaryl) 2
(Sept. 22, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety
/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM226959.pdf.
251. See GREEN, supra note 83, at 335–39 (noting that false positive findings can
produce costs of defense and incorrect verdicts and settlements that are relatively
measurable, but social costs associated with incorrect incentive effects are hard to
demonstrate and very hard to measure).
252. As shown in Part III.A, to respond with “but if the case is scientifically
uncertain then it is not legally proven” is to beg the question. In setting the point
at which scientific evidence will satisfy the burden of production, courts choose
between the risks of false negative and false positive findings.
253. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
254. See Green, supra note 18, at 387–88; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 15 (1998) (“Whether a product defect caused harm to
persons or property is determined by the prevailing rules and principles governing
causation in tort.”).
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or a product defect can be proven, however, a false negative
causation finding would under-deter conduct that should result in
255
liability. The Brock court defended its view that in mass tort cases
judges should take the causation reins from juries by reference to a
well-known passage from Holmes’s The Common Law: “But
supposing a state of facts is often repeated in practice, is it to be
imagined that the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury
256
forever?” The “standard” referred to is, of course, the standard of
conduct, the issue of negligence—a matter of judgment, not purely
257
a question of fact.
A final note on the efficiency rationale is appropriate. Some
antitrust scholars have argued that, for certain types of cases, false
negative errors are inherently less costly than false positive errors;
in time, they say, the market will correct a false negative finding but
the inefficiency caused by incorrectly imposing liability may persist
258
indefinitely.
In toxic torts, however, no reason exists to believe
this is so. The market mechanism of responsive behavior by
competing firms does not exist.
A market response to a false negative causation finding, if
possible at all, would have to result from consumers altering their
buying behavior to reduce their exposure to the suspected and
falsely exculpated product. Conceivably, if ready alternatives for
the product exist, manufacturers of the substitutes might turn to
marketing strategies exploiting consumer suspicions in an attempt
259
to cash in on a safety premium.
But the marketing machine
could also be used to tamp down any consumer concerns about the

255. If no or very little reason exists to believe that a product will cause a
particular disease, however, it is difficult to see how a deterrence signal based on
false causal ascription could be perceived and acted upon ex ante. After mass
exposures, an over-deterrence signal would presumably be perceived from an
accumulation of cases in which liability was imposed and the causation findings
were false positives.
256. Brock v. Merell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 310 n.8 (5th Cir. 1989).
257. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123–24 (1881), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2449/pg2449.html (last visited Jan. 27,
2011).
258. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1984); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of
Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 157 (2010).
259. Denise Grady, In Feast of Data on BPA Plastic, No Final Answer, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 2010, at D1 (stating that despite lack of clear scientific evidence of harm
from plastics containing suspected endocrine disruptor bisphenol-A, consumer
fears have improved sales of products advertised as lacking the substance).
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260

health effects of the now “exonerated” product.
And for many
products and exposures, consumer-driven reduction in exposure is
261
simply impracticable.
Perhaps more important, the consequences of a judicial false
negative are different in toxic torts than they are in antitrust, both
for the losing plaintiff and for society at large. The antitrust
plaintiff who wrongly loses suffers unjust pecuniary damages; while
the market corrects the anti-competitive behavior, competitors
and/or consumers suffer lost welfare, presumably in an amount
that decreases over time. The toxic tort plaintiff who wrongly loses
has suffered disease and perhaps death, to which the court adds the
indignity of no compensation, and often no sense of even being
heard. These consequences cannot be corrected, even if the
market eventually minimizes or eliminates future exposures.
IV. COMMENT C: RESHAPING TOWARD SYMMETRY
The Third Restatement does not shy away from the toxic tort
causation fray. In comment c to section 28, it jumps right in, with
262
forty-one pages of commentary and associated reporters’ note.
The treatment of this issue has been called “arguably the single
263
most controversial passage in the project.”
Much of the
contentiousness arose because comment c acknowledges several of
the jurisprudential trends that, together, helped to create the false
negative asymmetry. Those who disliked some or all of these trends
feared that by recognizing and reporting the law that reflects the
trends, the Third Restatement would have the effect of ratifying
264
and reinforcing them.
260. See BRANDT, supra note 232, at 161–63 (describing marketing campaigns
aimed at disarming early concerns about the effects of smoking on health).
261. Examples include exposures due to environmental releases (e.g., toxic air
emissions, releases to groundwater), exposures requiring product reformulations
that manufacturers cannot or will not perform (e.g., benzene in gasoline), current
exposures due to past use (e.g., asbestos, lead paint), and unlabeled exposures in
consumer products that render consumer choice difficult or impossible (e.g.,
bisphenol-A in aluminum cans, inert ingredients in household cleaners and other
products).
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c reporters’ note (2010). This discussion occupies nearly seven-percent of
the text of Volume I of the Third Restatement.
263. Sanders, supra note 20, at 1029.
264. See id. at 1035. Professor Sanders’s article on comment c persuasively
argues that these trends are real without taking sides on whether they are good or
bad developments.
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Given the infrequency and influence of a restatement, there is
some basis for this fear, as comment c accurately describes existing
265
law.
On the other hand, comment c is no mere recapitulation.
Its commentary on the nature of causal proof is potentially
subversive because it undermines the claim that courts’ de facto
preference for false negatives promotes more accurate fact-finding
on the toxic tort causation issue.
To understand comment c, it must first be put into context.
No black-letter section of the Third Restatement addresses injuries
caused by toxic substance exposure as a separate category of tort
law in the way, say, that injuries caused by wild animals receive
266
separate treatment.
Comment c elaborates on a provision that
simply says the plaintiff has the burden of proving cause-in-fact,
which the Third Restatement defines in traditional “but for”
267
terms. Thus, the Third Restatement treats causation in toxic tort
cases as a factually difficult application of a general principle, not
as an exceptional category of claim requiring special rules.
This treatment might disappoint those who have argued that
268
the difficulties of proof attending the “special problem” of toxic
tort causation justify using a causation standard that is in some way
less stringent. It also implies, however, that the difficulty of proving
toxic tort causation does not justify a more stringent standard: the
definition of causation is the same, the burden of persuasion is the
same, and the scrutiny of evidence proffered to satisfy the burden
269
should be the same. Toxic tort causation requires inference from
265. Critics of the trends in toxic tort causation doctrine have also observed
these trends; it seems unfair to blame the reporters for reporting them.
266. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
22 (2010) (setting forth the rule that owners or possessors of wild animals are
strictly liable for physical harm the animals cause).
267. Id. § 28(a) (plaintiff bears burden of proof); id. § 26 (defining factual
cause in “but for” terms). The Third Restatement acknowledges limited
exceptions to each principle. Id. § 27 (stating exception to “but for” causation for
multiple sufficient causal sets); id. § 28(b) (providing for shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant in an alternative liability situation as in Summers v. Tice,
199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)).
268. Id. § 28 cmt. c(1).
269. Id. § 28 cmt. c(1) at 402 (“In all of these cases, the requirement to prove
factual causation remains the same; the plaintiff must prove it by a preponderance
of the evidence, and the standards for factual causation set forth in §§ 26–27
continue to apply.”). The 2002 draft of comment c was less explicit, stating only
that “[t]he concept of factual causation remains the same in toxic-substances cases
as in other cases, but proof often requires specialized scientific studies.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(1) (Basic
Principles) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). The final language first appeared in the
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270

circumstantial evidence, but so does any causation finding.
To
reach a fact-finder, a plaintiff need do no more than is required in
any case: introduce “sufficient evidence to permit a rational
factfinder to make a determination that a defendant’s tortious
271
conduct was a factual cause of the harm . . . .” True, courts police
the evidence to ensure it supports a reasonable inference rather
272
than unwarranted speculation. But “the line between reasonable
inference and prohibited speculation is one of the more indistinct
lines that exists in law and also is one on which reasonable minds
273
can and do differ.”
From the outset, therefore, the Third
Restatement is clear that nothing about black-letter tort doctrine
compels the set of rules that courts have established to draw the line
between permissible and impermissible evidence of toxic causation.
Despite the reporters’ care in situating toxic tort causation as
unexceptional, the creation of comment c involved something
quite exceptional. As the reporters explain, “This Comment and
these Reporters’ Notes benefited significantly from a review of a
prior draft by a panel consisting of prominent epidemiologists and
a physician . . . ,” assembled under the auspices of the National
Academy of Sciences, which met with the reporters to discuss the
274
275
issues in response to objections to an earlier effort.
The
reporters would not have needed such assistance for a simple
canvass of judicial opinions. Comment c, as approved by the
American Law Institute, both describes and assesses the case law.
The presence of some normative content in a restatement is
perhaps not so extraordinary. What distinguishes comment c is
that it derives its norms primarily from science rather than from
legal analysis or a particular philosophy of justice.

2003 draft. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt.
c(1) (Basic Principles) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003). As explained in the text, this
presumably pro-defendant amendment (replacing “concept” with “requirement to
prove”) also serves to emphasize that toxic tort plaintiffs bear no special causation
burden. Id.
270. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. b (2010).
271. Id. § 28 cmt. a.
272. Id. at cmt. b.
273. Id.
274. Id. § 28 cmt. c reporters’ note.
275. See Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Liability for Physical
Harm, 2005 A.L.I. PROC. 33 (2005) (statement of Prof. Green).
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In that sense, comment c coheres with the judicial tendency to
276
Although
view toxic tort causation as a purely scientific issue.
critics of evolved toxic causation doctrine decry this judicial
277
“abdication,” perhaps all sides in the debate can agree that a little
dispassionate scientific advice is a good thing. Justice Breyer—no
friend of past toxic tort plaintiffs or current toxic substance
regulators—pled for the use of court-appointed scientific experts,
not beholden to a party on either side of a legal controversy, to
278
assess causation in toxic tort cases.
Comment c offers courts the teaching of experts one step
further removed, as they considered the issues in general, with no
specific party’s legal rights riding on the outcome.
A. General Causation and Specific Causation
As noted above, many courts have treated general causation
and specific causation as distinct components of a toxic tort
plaintiff’s case, each of which must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence—frequently by different types of evidence. Early
drafts of comment c acquiesced in this view. As the 2002 draft put
it, “even when general causation is established through the use of
group studies, further proof of specific causation is required.
Conversely, some evidence of general causation is a prerequisite to
279
proof of specific causation.”
By contrast, the final version states,
“specific causation requires attention even when general causation
is established through the use of group studies” and “in some
cases . . . the evidence bearing on specific causation may be
280
sufficient to pretermit the need to assess general causation.” The
final version also states that exposure, general causation, and
specific causation “are not ‘elements’ of a plaintiff’s cause of
281
action . . . .”

276. See Sanders, supra note 20, at 1041–45.
277. Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of
Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 943 (2003).
278. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 149–50 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
279. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(3)
(Basic Principles) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (emphasis added).
280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c(3) (2010). The “some cases” in which specific causation evidence is
unnecessary involve “signature” diseases. Id.
281. Id. § 28 cmt. c(1).
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The distinction between “elements” and “categories for
282
After all, a plaintiff who
analysis” is “somewhat formalistic.”
cannot prove exposure, general causation, and specific causation
usually will lose, and comment c does not say differently. But the
subtle change between Restatement versions is not pure formalism.
To see why, consider two plaintiffs in parallel universes, each
of whom advances a claim that ingestion of soma caused them to
suffer, after a latency period, the devastating disease somatosis.
Assume that causation is the only disputed issue in each case.
In our first parallel universe, the plaintiff proffers a qualified
expert witness who reliably testifies that analysis of plaintiff’s DNA
has revealed DNA-soma addition products (“adducts”), which are
consistent with the prevailing scientific model that somatosigenesis
begins with DNA alteration. The witness acknowledges that many
cases of somatosis occur even in people with no known soma
exposure and that not everyone who consumes soma develops
somatosis, but states that the plaintiff is not known to have been
exposed to any other risk factors and does not appear to have other
DNA adducts. The plaintiff in this first alternative universe
presents no other evidence on general causation.
In our second parallel universe, the plaintiff proffers a
qualified expert witness who reliably testifies that a perfectly
conducted epidemiologic study, which sampled two populations
absolutely identical in every respect except the consumption of
soma, found that the incidence of somatosis is 100 times higher
283
among soma eaters.
The witness acknowledges that many cases
of somatosis occur even in people with no known soma exposure
284
and that not everyone who consumes soma develops somatosis.
The plaintiff in this second alternative universe presents no other
evidence on specific causation.
If general and specific causation are separate elements of the
claim requiring distinct proof, both hypothetical plaintiffs would
have to lose without reaching a fact-finder. The first plaintiff’s case,
supported by specific causation evidence that is about as good as it
theoretically gets, would fail for lack of proof of general causation.

282. Sanders, supra note 20, at 1032.
283. Assume, moreover, that this result is statistically significant at the 99.99%
level and that plaintiff is indistinguishable in any meaningful way from the people
studied.
284. To avoid any dose-response issue, assume also that the plaintiff and the
soma eaters in the study consumed the same quantity of soma.
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The second plaintiff’s case, supported by general causation
evidence that is about as good as it theoretically gets, would fail for
285
lack of proof of specific causation. Neither case is airtight.
Yet
each presents circumstantial evidence that should be more than
286
enough to get to a fact-finder.
One could question these examples by arguing that really strong
group-based evidence amounts to proof of specific causation and
really strong particularistic evidence amounts to proof of general
causation. But that is exactly why comment c’s distinction between
“elements” and “organizational categories” is more than formal.
These hypotheticals show, and comment c teaches us, that the need
for “general” and “specific” causation evidence is a matter of
degree, not a matter of doctrinal coherence or scientific
287
accuracy.
In many cases, perhaps in the great majority of cases,
courts will draw that line in such a way that both types of proof are
required. But the line need not and should not always be drawn
this way.

285. It is conceivable that the first plaintiff’s somatosis was caused by some
undetected factor, and the DNA-soma adducts are not the real cause in this
plaintiff, even if they initiate somatosigenesis in others. For the second plaintiff
(who more than satisfied the relative risk greater than two threshold, and so would
presumably prevail under the articulated law of many jurisdictions), it is
conceivable—even with very strong assumptions virtually ruling out sampling
error, bias, and confounding—that the association of soma and somatosis is
coincidental rather than causal. Epidemiologists would assess that possibility by
use of the Bradford Hill criteria, some of which the hypothetical satisfies (e.g.,
strength of association). None of the Bradford Hill criteria, however, would
require particularistic evidence of “specific causation.”
286. To test this, one might consider one’s own willingness to step into the
shoes of each hypothetical plaintiff. On the facts of the first hypothetical, would a
reasonable person be willing to have soma adducts formed in his or her DNA in
the hope they would not cause somatosis? On the facts of the second, would a
reasonable person be willing to consume the relevant amount of soma in the hope
the association is coincidental?
287. Comment c arguably limits the severability of general causation and
specific causation to cases in which “group-based statistical evidence is proffered.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt.
c(1) (2010). By contrast, if “group-based evidence is unavailable or inconclusive,
and other forms of evidence are used, the general and specific causation issues
may merge into a single inquiry.” Id. This does not imply, however, that if
epidemiology is unavailable, anything goes; the issues may merge but the plaintiff
still must prove causation.
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B. Epidemiologic Evidence and Relative Risk Thresholds
In comment c’s treatment of epidemiology, three features
stand out. First, comment c addresses the two distinct ways in
which courts may treat epidemiologic proof as a threshold
requirement: whether a showing of causation sufficient to raise a
fact issue requires some epidemiologic proof, and whether such a
showing requires epidemiologic studies finding a relative risk
greater than two.
Second, comment c takes a thoroughly
pragmatic approach to the use of epidemiology in litigation.
Third, comment c and the associated Reporters’ Note effortlessly
meld description of how courts have treated epidemiology with
prescription of how courts should treat epidemiology.
1.

Is Epidemiology Mandatory?

Comment c acknowledges that “[o]ccasionally, courts have
suggested or implied that a plaintiff cannot meet the burden of
288
production on causation without epidemiologic evidence.”
Descriptively, the comment makes the unassailable observation that
those court opinions “often” involved situations in which a large
body of epidemiologic evidence indicated a lack of association
289
between the agent and the disease.
Prescriptively, the comment
states that the requirement of epidemiologic evidence is best
290
limited to similar situations.
The rationale for this judgment is
pragmatic: for various reasons, epidemiologic evidence sometimes
291
is simply unavailable.
Contrary to the assertions of some of comment c’s critics, the
comment does not imply that if no good evidence of causation
292
exists, plaintiffs are free to use bad evidence of causation.
Rather, comment c adopts the position of “[m]any courts . . . that
requiring proof by scientific evidence that does not exist and is not
reasonably available to the plaintiff when other, reasonably
probative evidence exists is an overbroad method for screening
293
Just what “other, reasonably probative evidence” might
cases.”
288. Id. at cmt. c(3).
289. Id.
290. See id.
291. Id.
292. See Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Liability for Physical
Harm, supra note 275 (statements of Ms. Bowbeer and Ms. Wells).
293. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c reporters’ note (2010) (citing more than two dozen cases).
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be, is a subject on which comment c is largely silent.
Nonetheless, simply by acknowledging the possibility that general
causation can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence
without the benefit of studies of the same disease and the same
substance at the same exposure level in human beings who are just
like the plaintiff, comment c undermines the claim that the need
for accurate fact-finding requires judicial enforcement of the false
negative asymmetry.
2.

Must Relative Risk Exceed Two?

Comment c acknowledges that as a scientific matter
epidemiology cannot and does not investigate causation of
295
individual cases of disease, but reports and endorses courts’
widely (if not universally and sometimes uncomfortably) accepted
willingness to infer from group-based causation evidence to
296
individual cases. From there, it is no great distance for comment
c to accept the reasoning that led to the relative risk greater than
two rule in the first place: if more than fifty-percent of the disease
in an exposed population is attributable to a toxic exposure, then
the disease of any exposed individual must, more likely than not,
297
also be attributable to exposure.
Accepting that logic, however,
did not lead the reporters to agree to the propriety of the doubled
298
relative risk threshold. Quite the contrary.

294. The reporters describe one exception, a case in which strong
circumstantial evidence of specific causation sufficed to establish general
causation, where more typical general causation evidence was simply unavailable.
Id. at 457 (citing Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1998)).
295. Id. at 449.
296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c(4).
297. Although widely employed and endorsed by the Third Restatement, this
leap is technically incorrect. If a jar contains seventy red jelly beans and thirty
green jelly beans, the probability that a randomly-selected jelly bean will be red is
seventy percent, but the chosen bean is either red or green—it is not seventy
percent likely to be red. The problem in toxic torts, of course, is that except in
rare cases it is impossible to see the color of the bean. See generally Wright, supra
note 170, at 1311–17 (arguing against interpreting preponderance standard as
statistical probability).
298. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c(4) (“[A]ny judicial requirement that plaintiffs must show a threshold
increase in risk or a doubling in incidence in a group study in order to satisfy the
burden of proof of specific causation is usually inappropriate.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

61

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 6

1568

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

Comment c recognizes that various factors may affect the
persuasiveness of inference from the findings of a group-based
299
study to the assessment of causation in an individual case. Several
of those factors read like the “similarity” requirements imposed by
the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Havner: the Third
Restatement notes potential differences in degree of exposure to
the alleged cause, exposure to other potential causes, and
300
But the
plaintiff’s individual risk-conferring characteristics.
Restatement’s concept of similarity is not so one-sided as Havner’s
holding that an expert opinion should be excluded if the plaintiff
is different from the population in the study on which the opinion
is based. A plaintiff whose exposure dose was different from,
perhaps less than, the exposure of the study subjects might
overcome the difference by evidence of a dose-response
relationship. Or a plaintiff might be able to demonstrate individual
characteristics that confer not increased risk of disease in general,
but increased risk of disease if exposed to the toxic agent in
301
question.
More important, the reporters quote an epidemiology text’s
acknowledgment that epidemiologists assign the same risk value to
all members of a study category simply because measuring the
302
individual risk is impossible. Comment c accordingly notes that it
may be possible for an individual to produce evidence about his or
303
her individual risk.
If other potential causes of a condition are
known, but their applicability can be ruled out in a particular
plaintiff’s case, this “increases the probability that the agent in

299. Id.
300. Id. (“[T]he extent to which the group-study outcome reflects the
increased risk to the plaintiff depends on the plaintiff’s similarity to those
included in the group study.”).
301. For example, certain genotypes may confer increased or decreased
susceptibility to an exposure’s toxic effects. See, e.g., Frederica P. Perera, Molecular
Epidemiology: On the Path to Prevention?, 92 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 602, 604 (2000)
(stating that “individual variations in metabolic pathways and DNA repair
mechanisms play an important role in breast cancer risk” among women exposed
to carcinogens).
302. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c reporters’ note (2010) (quoting KENNETH J. ROTHMAN & SANDER
GREENLAND, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 9 (2d ed. 1998)).
303. Id. § 28 cmt. c (2010) (“[C]ourts should permit the parties to attempt to
show, based on the sorts of evidence described above [including various factors
individual to the plaintiff], whether the plaintiff’s disease was more likely than not
caused by the agent.”).
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304

question was responsible for that plaintiff’s disease.”
Increasing
the probability of a material fact at issue is, of course, the very
305
definition of relevance.
This understanding explodes several postulates frequently
propounded in court opinions that apply the false negative
asymmetry. First, it destroys the claim that the “corpuscular”
approach to causation evidence, imposing a de facto sufficiency test
on each bit of scientific support for an expert’s opinion or a
plaintiff’s allegation of causation, automatically produces more
accurate decision making. Second, it necessarily implies that
testimony in the nature of differential diagnosis may be probative
even if the plaintiff cannot rule out all alternative causes of
306
plaintiff’s disease.
Third, it demonstrates that particularistic
evidence can and should be allowed to cut both ways, fatally
undermining the “benchmark” use of a relative risk exceeding two
307
in cases like Estate of George.
Nothing in these observations about comment c—or in
comment c itself—suggests an “anything goes” approach to proof
of causation. If a plaintiff’s evidence explains away causes that
account for only a little disease incidence, the evidence might not
be sufficient to push the plaintiff over the preponderance
308
standard. Moreover, the comment conditions the applicability of
individual risk-modifying factors with the proviso, “[s]o long as
309
there is adequate evidence of general causation.”
Once again,
comment c makes no attempt to describe just what that adequate
304. Id.
305. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“‘[R]elevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”).
306. Furthermore, it implies exactly the opposite, that even differential
diagnoses that can rule out only causes known to account for a small amount of
the incidence of disease may be critical, depending on what the other causation
evidence shows. As discussed in the next paragraph, to say such evidence is
relevant is not to imply that it will always be sufficient.
307. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. c reporters’ note (2010) (noting that some differences between
study population and plaintiff may make study inapposite but others may simply
require adjustments when making inferences from group-based study to individual
case).
308. See id. (“When the causes of a disease are largely unknown, however,
differential etiology is of little assistance.”). The combination of a moderately
strong epidemiologic association with some ability to rule out alternate causes,
however, may provide sufficient evidence.
309. Id.
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evidence might be in all cases. The comment is clear, though, that
adequate evidence could be epidemiology with a relative risk less
310
than two, and persuasively explains why this is so.
C. The Role of Scientific Judgment and Inference
Judicial implementation of the false negative asymmetry relies
primarily on one or both of two closely-related devices: setting a
judicially-defined standard of “good science” that can deliver
reliable evidence and confining inference from scientific data to a
311
The scientist’s understanding
narrow range of evidentiary “fit.”
of science that informs comment c undermines any general claim
that these approaches produce more accurate fact-finding.
Although science is brought to bear on claims of toxic
causation, scientists themselves informed the reporters that
“[u]nfortunately no set formula or algorithm exists for deciding
whether a human illness or condition is the consequence of a given
312
exposure to a drug, chemical, or some other agent.” This reality
313
applies broadly to the evidence vel non of toxic causation.
Thus, for example, epidemiologic results require causal
interpretation. As comment c notes (but courts seldom do), the
need for interpretation works both ways:
Whether an inference of causation based on an
association is appropriate is a matter of informed
judgment, not scientific methodology, as is a judgment
whether a study that finds no association is exonerative or
inconclusive. . . . [One factor to be considered is] an
assessment of other scientific evidence that bears on the
causal relationship under consideration. . . . The saliency

310. Id.
311. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–46 (1997) (discussing
several studies relied on by plaintiff’s experts as being too different from plaintiff
to support inference of causation); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706, 721 (Tex. 1997) (“[C]ourts should not foreclose the possibility that
advances in science may require reevaluation of what is ‘good science’ in future
cases.”).
312. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c reporters’ note (2010) (quoting Jerome P. Kassirer, Joint Discussion of
Science, Technology, & Law Panel & American Law Institute: Restatement of Torts
12 (Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/stl
/PGA_049555).
313. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c reporters’ note (2010) (“This comment could encompass the variety of
circumstances that may exist in a toxic-substances case . . . .”).
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of other evidence of causation often entails considerable
judgment. Thus, in some cases, reasonable scientists can
come to differing conclusions on whether a body of
epidemiologic data justifies an inference of causation.
Similarly, reasonable scientists may, in some instances,
disagree on whether the absence of an association is
314
exonerative of the agent or is merely inconclusive.
The same conclusion holds for other issues commonly debated
in toxic tort causation cases such as evidence of biological
plausibility and inference from one biological effect to causation of
315
a related disease.
In the absence of a definitive scientific algorithm for assessing
causal claims, where science is genuinely uncertain, reasonable
scientists may differ. Courts applying the false negative asymmetry
rarely if ever recognize that possibility; instead, the opportunity for
reasonable difference is deemed to show that the law must reject a
316
causal claim because science has not yet proven it.
That
reasonable scientists may differ does not mean that every difference
317
But by emphasizing
of opinion between scientists is reasonable.
the role of judgment in causal attribution, comment c teaches that
314. Id. § 28 cmt. c (2010).
315. See id. § 28 cmt. c reporters’ note (identifying elements in the causal
reasoning process for which no scientific algorithm exists). The Restatement
acknowledges, albeit in a quite limited way, the possibility that evidence of
biological mechanism by which an agent causes one disease could permit an
inference that the agent causes a related disease. Id. at 446. Courts should
consider whether the known or suspected biological mechanism supports
reasonable analogy and whether fine subdivisions in disease-type classifications
reasonably reflect variation in the underlying biological mechanism. Compare, e.g.,
Casdorph v. W.Va. Office Ins. Comm’r, 690 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 2009) (affirming
worker’s compensation award where claimant’s expert inferred causal link
between benzene and one type of leukemia based on evidence that benzene
causes another type of leukemia), with Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Group,
Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D. Mass. 2009) (excluding plaintiff’s expert testimony
because defense experts testified that benzene caused leukemia by damaging
chromosomes in a specific way not observed in plaintiff’s type of leukemia), rev’d,
No. 09-2270, 2011 WL 982385 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2011). For discussion of the First
Circuit’s opinion in Milward, see infra Part IV.D.2.
316. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145 (reasoning that if a study’s authors declined to
infer a causal relationship, the study could not support an expert’s conclusion of
causation).
317. Thus, this discussion does not imply that every plaintiff’s expert should be
allowed to testify and that every plaintiff’s case supported by an expert should
reach a jury. Certainly comment c makes no such claim. The reporter’s note to
comment c offers express approval to numerous cases in which plaintiffs’ evidence
was held inadmissible or insufficient. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c reporters’ note (2010).
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judicial hostility to the application of judgment and inference in
support of causal claims does not necessarily provide legal answers
that are more scientifically accurate. Where reasonable scientists
can differ, neither truth-seeking nor the allocation of the burden of
proof compels the false negative asymmetry.
Comment c notes that outside the courtroom, scientists might
apply quite a different asymmetry:
Scientists’ judgments about causation outside the legal
context may also be affected by the comparative costs of
errors, as when caution counsels in favor of declaring an
uncertain agent toxic because the potential harm it may
cause if toxic is so much greater than the benefit forgone
318
if it were not introduced.
This is a fair paraphrase of the precautionary principle
frequently advocated as an appropriate basis for environmental
319
Whatever its virtues and faults, the precautionary
regulation.
principle certainly does not describe how our society actually treats
the introduction and use of potentially toxic substances. Despite a
huge amount of scientific effort, we have little to no firm
320
knowledge of the toxicology of most substances. In the one area
where we attempt a version of the precautionary principle,
approval of drugs, unexpected harms nevertheless regularly
321
become apparent after approval.
322
Tort law also is not premised on the precautionary principle,
and in 2005, the reporters had to assure the American Law Institute
that comment c was not intended to embrace a regulatory
323
precautionary principle in a torts context.
Still, by showing that
reasonable scientists may differ—an acknowledgment almost never
seen in the “truth-seeking” case law—comment c provides courts

318.
319.

Id. § 28 cmt. c.
See Robert V. Percival, Who’s Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 23–27 (Winter 2005-2006) (describing history of various
articulations of precautionary principle).
320. Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic
Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1447–48 (2005) (“Reliable information regarding
carcinogenic and other health effects is available for relatively few substances. For
many substances, health effects are unknown.”).
321. See supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text.
322. See Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 673 (6th Cir. 2010)
(contrasting physician’s use of precautionary principle to advise patient to avoid
suspected cause of disease with judicial preponderance standard).
323. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
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with a way to apply a scientifically legitimate but flexible approach
to toxic tort causation.
D. Comment c and the Courts
Comment c provides a convincing rationale for reshaping
toxic tort causation requirements toward symmetry. Whether
courts will take that path remains to be seen. As of this writing,
only two reported decisions have discussed comment c in a
324
substantive way.
1.

Ranes v. Adams Laboratories, Inc.
325

In Ranes v. Adams Laboratories, Inc., the Iowa Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court’s exclusion of plaintiff’s expert causation
326
testimony and the ensuing summary judgment for defendants.
Considering how unfavorable the plaintiff’s facts were, it is a
surprisingly subtle opinion.
Mr. Ranes alleged that a few doses of cold medicine containing
phenylpropanolamine (PPA) had caused a broad range of
symptoms, including widely dispersed pain and numbness, that
continued and became more severe long after he stopped taking
327
the medicine.
The plaintiff’s expert witness, a toxicologist who
had reviewed plaintiff’s medical records but never examined him,
concluded that the plaintiff suffered from cerebral vasculitis or a
328
stroke.
Relying on case reports and an epidemiologic study that
found increased risk of stroke in women (but not men) who had
329
consumed PPA-containing pills for weight loss, the expert was
prepared to testify that PPA had caused plaintiff’s progressive
330
neurologic symptoms. The court’s lengthy factual recitation took
care to note that the plaintiff sought medical treatment for these
symptoms before consuming the PPA and that numerous treating
neurologists and imaging technologies failed to find any objective
324. A LEXIS search conducted on September 20, 2010 found only three
federal or state court opinions citing comment c in any way, including (search
terms and result on file with author). As this article was in the final stages of
preparation for publication, one additional court opinion citing comment c was
issued. See infra Part IV.D.2.
325. 778 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 2010).
326. Id. at 697.
327. Id. at 682–83.
328. Id. at 684.
329. Id. at 692.
330. Id. at 684.
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331

evidence of stroke or vasculitis.
Before Ranes, Iowa had rejected the Frye general acceptance
test but also declined wholesale adoption of Daubert, “suggesting”
that courts consider the Daubert factors with respect to “particularly
332
novel or complex” scientific evidence.
Although trial judges in
Iowa must assess expert testimony for reliability and relevance
333
before admitting it, Iowa uses an “ad hoc approach”
to
determining scientific reliability. “Generally,” the Iowa Supreme
Court has “been committed to a liberal view on the admissibility of
334
expert testimony.” Ranes, however, pushed the court too far.
As a result, the court embraced a form of toxic tort
exceptionalism that is something of a hallmark of the false negative
asymmetry. Noting that “we encourage a more expansive judicial
335
gatekeeping function in difficult scientific cases” and that Daubert
itself was a toxic tort case, the court endorsed use of the Daubert
factors—as well as federal case law interpreting Daubert—in toxic
336
tort cases.
The court rejected plaintiff’s expert’s reliance on the
epidemiologic study linking PPA to stroke because no evidence
337
suggested plaintiff had suffered a stroke.
The court rejected the
expert’s reliance on case reports partly because of the limited
utility of such evidence but principally because the symptoms in the
338
case reports differed significantly from plaintiff’s symptoms.
Despite these wholly appropriate rulings, the Ranes court took
some care to avoid creating rigid rules for causation proof. The
339
court emphasized that it was not demanding scientific certainty
331. Id. at 682–84.
332. Id. at 686.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 685. Even in Ranes, the Iowa Supreme Court emphasized repeatedly
that scrutiny of expert opinions should be based on methodology, not
conclusions. Id. at 691. The court expressly rejected the holding from Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), extending Daubert beyond scientific
testimony to “technical or other specialized knowledge.” Id. at 686.
335. Id. at 686.
336. Id. at 687.
337. Id. at 692 (“All eight neurologists involved with Ranes’ case refuted the
diagnosis of stroke. . . . [T]his case-control study is not relevant to the injuries
alleged in this case and cannot be the basis of any general causation opinion.”).
338. Id. at 694 (noting that plaintiff’s expert relied on clinical experience in
which PPA caused symptoms that disappeared after administration of PPA ceased,
unlike plaintiff whose symptoms continued to worsen; expert testified that “no
existing case reports” showed plaintiff’s symptomology).
339. Id. at 688 (“[P]laintiff’s expert must only be qualified to offer a theory of
causation for the jury’s consideration, not absolute certainty. There must be
evidence that would permit a reasonable person to conclude the drug probably
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and stated that epidemiologic proof is not required, citing with
approval a federal case in which expert testimony based on “case
340
reports in addition to other facts” was admitted.
In rejecting
plaintiff’s expert’s reliance on dissimilar case reports, the court
noted the lack of “facts or circumstances to support the analogy”;
presumably in another case where such “circumstances” were
341
shown, the testimony would more likely be admitted.
The
flexibility reflected in these statements is fully consistent with the
thrust of comment c.
Ranes expressly invoked comment c in discussing general
causation and specific causation, a “bifurcated analysis” that
342
previously had “not been explicitly used as the standard in Iowa.”
The court observed that comment c “recognized this relatively
recent common practice as a ‘device[] to organize a court’s
analysis’ and not as additional elements of the tort,” and quoted
343
the Restatement’s analysis at some length.
Ranes concluded that
“it is appropriate for courts to use the bifurcated causation language
in toxic-tort cases,” but went on to say that “both types of causation
344
must be proven.”
The causation evidence in Ranes was so poor
that it remains unclear whether Iowa will treat general causation
and specific causation in the manner suggested by comment c or
more like “elements” of a claim—each requiring separate proof.
Ranes illustrates the principle that bad toxic tort claims make
hard toxic tort causation rules that may later be applied to dismiss
better but uncertain claims. What Ranes most has in common with
the cases that created the false negative asymmetry is a reticence to
apply a judicial version of Occam’s razor by deciding cases on the
narrowest ground possible. The plaintiff’s causation theory rested
entirely on the diagnosis that plaintiff “suffered from the effects of
345
vasculitis.” The Iowa Supreme Court held that plaintiff’s expert’s
346
diagnosis was unreliable and the expert, as a toxicologist, was not
caused the injury claimed.”).
340. Id. at 693 (citing Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929–31 (8th
Cir. 2001)).
341. Id. at 694.
342. Id. at 688.
343. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c (2010)).
344. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
345. Id. at 695.
346. Id. at 696–97 (noting, for example, that although plaintiff’s expert
purported to conduct a differential diagnosis to determine that plaintiff had
vasculitis, the expert “summarily dismissed as many as eight mimicking conditions
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even qualified to give an expert opinion on such a complex
347
To dispose of the case, no more was
neurological diagnosis.
required. Yet Iowa now has an opinion of its supreme court that
seems to stand for aspects of the false negative asymmetry, and that
justifies its result, once again, by concluding that “[l]aw lags
348
science.”
2.

Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc.

As this article was going to press, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit issued its opinion in Milward v. Acuity
349
reversing the district court’s
Specialty Products Group, Inc.,
exclusion of plaintiffs’ expert on general causation.
The scenario Milward presented to the court was the antithesis
of Ranes in almost every way. Mr. Milward’s alleged exposure—to
350
benzene—was lengthy and occupational. His diagnosed illness—
acute promyelocytic leukemia (APL)—was severe and
351
And his expert witness—Dr. Martyn Smith—was
uncontested.
“acknowledged as a leading expert” on the study of benzene
352
toxicity and the causes of leukemia and lymphoma.
Dr. Smith invoked a “weight of the evidence” methodology in
concluding that at least four pieces of circumstantial evidence,
353
taken together, supported an inference of causation. The district
due to his lack of background and experience in diagnosing neurological
diseases”).
347. Id. at 695 (“[N]o evidence was offered to reveal sufficient experience,
knowledge, or training to show [plaintiff’s expert] was qualified to render such a
complex diagnosis.”).
348. Id. at 697 (quoting Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir.
1996)).
349. No. 09-2270, 2011 WL 982385 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2011).
350. Id. at *1.
351. Id.
352. Id. at *3. The court of appeals (but not the district court) noted that at
the Daubert hearing, plaintiffs also introduced testimony by Dr. Carl Cranor, a
philosopher of science. Id. at *1.
353. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 664 F. Supp.2d 137, 143-44 (D.
Mass. 2009), rev’d, No. 09-2270, 2011 WL 982385 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2011). The
four bases of the expert’s opinion were: (1) benzene is known to cause other subtypes of acute myelogenous leukemia (AML), with which the APL sub-type has
enough in common to infer a common pathogenesis; (2) APL is characterized by
breakage and rearrangement of a particular chromosome, and benzene is known
to have the ability to break chromosomes; (3) benzene metabolites are known to
inhibit an enzyme that protects chromosomes from damage, and chemicals that
inhibit the same enzyme are known to cause various sub-types of AML; and (4)
limited epidemiologic study shows an increased risk of APL associated with
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court examined each piece of support individually and concluded
that each failed Daubert’s reliability prong because the validity of
354
inferring causation from each of them remained in doubt.
The
355
First Circuit rejected this “atomistic[]” approach and held that a
jury should decide whether or not to accept the expert’s
356
conclusion.
Four features of the First Circuit’s opinion stand out. For each
of these salient points, the court expressly drew significant support
from comment c.
First, the court of appeals issued the strongest and most
explicit judicial endorsement to date of a weight of the evidence
methodology for proof of causation in a toxic tort case. In contrast
to courts that have treated the absence of quantitative weighting
357
factors as an absence of scientific rigor, the First Circuit agreed
with the plaintiffs that “weight of the evidence” is not standardless
mush but a methodology that scientists may legitimately use for
358
assessing causation.
In doing so, the court relied in part on the
Third Restatement’s observation that “[n]o algorithm exists for
applying the [Bradford] Hill guidelines to determine whether an
359
association truly reflects a causal relationship or is spurious.”
Second, the court of appeals accepted without discussion the
implicit premise of Dr. Smith’s testimony that the existence of
some of the Bradford Hill factors could support a causation
inference even in the absence of a statistically significant
360
association found by epidemiology, a premise some other courts
occupational exposure to benzene, although the results are not statistically
significant. Id.
354. Id. at 144–49. The technique, of course, is similar to the Supreme Court
majority’s approach in Joiner. See supra notes 214-218 and accompanying text.
355. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *9.
356. Id. at *1.
357. Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 379 (Vt.
2010).
358. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *5; see id. at n.9 (treating as limited to its
facts Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996), which stated that
weight of the evidence approach was appropriate for the lower threshold of proof
for regulatory agencies implementing a “preventive perspective”).
359. Id. at *9 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(3)). For discussion of the Bradford Hill guidelines,
see also Green, supra note 64, at 375-79.
360. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *4 (explaining expert’s use of Bradford Hill
guidelines); id. at *11 (noting that epidemiologic studies “do not offer conclusive
statistically significant evidence either way”). The district court was similarly silent.
See Milward, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 142–43 (describing Dr. Smith’s opinion without
mentioning Bradford Hill guidelines). The defendants’ appellate brief repeatedly
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361

have rejected.
This premise is consistent with the decision’s
overall approach to epidemiology.
The district court
acknowledged that epidemiology “is not always essential” but
agreed with the defendants that “epidemiological studies are
362
ordinarily needed.”
The court of appeals opined that the trial
judge “read too much into the paucity of statistically significant
363
epidemiological studies.” Distinguishing this case from situations
in which numerous powerful epidemiologic studies found no
association, the First Circuit noted not only the small number of
epidemiologic studies of benzene and APL but also the inherently
364
In such circumstances, the little
limited power of those studies.
epidemiologic evidence that exists becomes a subsidiary
consideration that may or may not tend to confirm other bases for
365
the causal inference, rather than the other way around.
The First Circuit held that the jury should evaluate the parties’
experts’ conflicting views of the meaning of the epidemiologic
366
evidence.
That holding is consistent with comment c’s
explanation that “other, reasonably probative evidence” could
suffice in the absence of epidemiologic results that are practically
367
unobtainable.

referred to the absence of epidemiologic support for Dr. Smith’s conclusion but
barely mentioned it in connection with the Bradford Hill guidelines. See Brief for
Defendants-Appellees at 38 n.18, Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., No. 092270, 2011 WL 982385 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2011).
361. E.g., Dunn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 275 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678-79
(M.D.N.C. 2003).
362. Milward, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
363. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *11 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(3) reporters’ note (2010)).
364. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *11 (stating that “the few studies . . . do not
offer conclusive statistically significant evidence either way, in part because the
rarity of APL makes it nearly impossible to perform a large enough study”).
According to apparently undisputed facts recited in both the Milward opinions,
the incidence of APL is in the range of 2 to 8 cases per million people. Id. at *4
(stating AML incidence is 3.5 cases per 100,000, of which five to ten percent are
APL); Milward, 664. F. Supp. 2d at 143 (giving AML incidence as six to eight cases
per 100,000, of which five to ten percent are APL).
365. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *11 (noting that plaintiffs’ expert testified
“that the limited epidemiological evidence was at the very least consistent with,
and suggestive of, the conclusion that benzene can cause APL” but “did not infer
causality from this suggestion alone”).
366. Id. at *10.
367. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c (2010).
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Third, the court of appeals fully embraced comment c’s
teaching that the scientific method and the exercise of judgment
368
are not incompatible and are actually inseparable.
Defendants
argued that only personal beliefs underlay the plaintiffs’ expert’s
369
The court did not agree,
“weight of the evidence” conclusion.
finding that the weight of the evidence approach made the role of
judgment “more readily apparent” but that judgment and
interpretation are required regardless of the methodology used to
370
evaluate causation. The opinion correctly notes that quantitative
results and statistical significance testing, as are found in
epidemiologic studies, do not eliminate the need for the exercise
371
of scientific judgment.
Fourth, the court of appeals emphasized, as comment c
emphasized, that a reasonable difference of scientific opinion does
372
not render a causation expert’s testimony inadmissible.
The
court noted that the defendants’ experts, though they disagreed
with the plaintiffs’ expert’s conclusion, acknowledged that
reasonable scientists agreed with important parts of the basis of
373
that conclusion.
For example, plaintiffs’ expert testified that a
feature common to the genesis of APL and other AML sub-types
374
supported the inference that all shared a common etiology. The
defendants’ experts, by contrast, emphasized the many ways in
375
which APL is different from other sub-types of AML. The dispute
was not over whether these differences exist, but about whether they
are important to the validity of the inference. The First Circuit
appropriately held that deciding that dispute entailed weighing the
368. Id. at *5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(3), c(4)).
369. See, e.g., Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 66, Milward v. Acuity Specialty
Prods. Grp., No. 09-2270, 2011 WL 982385 (1st Cir. Mar. 22, 2011) (characterizing
weight of the evidence approach as “based solely on subjective and undisclosed
personal views”).
370. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(1) (2010)).
371. Id. at *5 n.8 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(3) (2010).
372. Id. at *5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(4) reporters’ note (2010)).
373. Id. at *6 nn.10, 11.
374. Id. at *6; see also supra note 354.
375. See, e.g., Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 61, Milward v. Acuity Specialty
Prods. Grp., 664 F. Supp.2d 137, 143-44 (D. Mass. 2009), No. 09-2270
(characterizing weight of the evidence approach as “based solely on subjective and
undisclosed personal views”).
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376

evidence rather than assessing its reliability.
This last aspect of Milward offers the greatest promise of
reshaping toxic tort causation law toward symmetrical treatment of
potential errors. Guided in part by comment c, the First Circuit
refused to denigrate causation evidence merely because the
evidence required inference, incremental assembly, and reliance
on scientific evidence that may not satisfy a judicially-crafted ideal.
The district court had rejected as unreliable the various
building blocks of plaintiffs’ expert’s conclusion, not because they
had been proven wrong but because they were debatable. The
validity of reasoning that benzene can cause APL by analogy to
other sub-types of AML, for instance, depended in part on the stage
of cellular maturation at which a developing blood cell becomes
leukemic: transformation at an early stage would tend to support
plaintiffs’ expert’s inference, while transformation only at a later
377
stage would tend to negate it.
The district court, quoting a
published paper for the proposition that in APL the transformation
378
“may occur” at a later stage, concluded that the scientific answer
to this question remains elusive and therefore the proffered
379
testimony must be excluded.
The court of appeals, by contrast, confronted with a record
demonstrating that the issue is “currently the focus of extensive
scientific research and debate and on which reasonable scientists
can clearly disagree,” held that the appropriate conclusion was not
to deem the plaintiffs’ evidence unreliable but to send the dispute
380
to a jury. For purposes of evaluating expert testimony, the court
381
held, “[l]ack of certainty is not . . . the same thing as guesswork.”
The court did not relieve the plaintiffs of their burden of proving

376. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *9.
377. Milward, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 144-45.
378. Id. at 145.
379. Id. at 146. Similarly, the district court rejected as unreliable two other
pieces of indirect evidence. The court rejected the reasoning that because
benzene is known to cause some chromosome breaks, it could cause the
chromosome break usually seen in APL, absent “direct observational evidence” of
the latter effect. Id. at 147. The court also held inapplicable the fact that benzene
metabolites are known to inhibit an enzyme, the inhibition of which by other
chemicals is known to produce other AML sub-types, based on an article
concluding that the precise mechanism by which benzene causes leukemia cannot,
at this time, be “confidently identif[ied].” Id. at 148.
380. Milward, 2011 WL 982385, at *9.
381. Id. at *8 (quoting Primiano v. Cook, No. 06-15563, 2010 WL 1660303, at
*5 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2010)).
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causation by a preponderance of the evidence – but it also did not
382
impose on plaintiffs the entire burden of scientific uncertainty.
Whether other courts will follow Milward and its application of
comment c remains to be seen. And of course Milward does not, as
it could not, overrule the Daubert trilogy. Even in the First Circuit,
a plaintiff who overplays a Milward hand will likely lose a Daubert
challenge: procuring an expert willing to incant “weight of the
evidence” will not provide an automatic ticket to a jury. But by the
same token, a defense expert who fastidiously avoids an honest
confession that “reasonable scientists may disagree” will not thereby
ensure automatic exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert. District judges
hearing toxic tort cases in the First Circuit still wield the discretion
of gatekeepers. Milward instructs them to be on the lookout for
disputes marked by scientific uncertainty and reasonable scientific
disagreement, without providing much guidance about how to
know when they have found one. But Milward at least tells district
judges, quite clearly, that when they do find one, their rulings
should not be distorted by the false negative asymmetry.
V. CONCLUSION
The trajectory of toxic tort litigation induced many courts to
elaborate rules for proof of causation that, collectively, created the
false negative asymmetry. The science rationale, the legitimacy
rationale, and the welfare rationale do not provide adequate
justification for the general application of the false negative
asymmetry. Commingled with all these rationales is the claim that
the rules comprising the false negative asymmetry promote
superior truth-seeking. The commentary on toxic causation in the
Third Restatement undermines this claim. As courts continue to
decide toxic tort causation controversies, they undoubtedly will
look to comment c for guidance. They will be able to find in it, as
in any text, a variety of meanings. Yet if courts take care to learn
fully the teaching of comment c, they will find not just a
restatement of what courts have done but an opportunity to
reshape what they will do, for the better.

382.

Id. at *1.
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